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Introduction
Governments play a central role in shaping the lives of their constituents; they decide
to whom to allocate state resources, they determine how taxes are raised to finance
government spending, and they shape their population’s beliefs.
Despite an extensive literature on these issues, important questions remain unan-
swered. While economists have analyzed the drivers of and incentives for the allo-
cation of resources in democracies, mechanisms of resource allocation decisions in
autocracies are less clear. One important difference between these regimes is that
autocratic governments not only allocate resources, but also tools of repression. We
do not know whom autocratic regimes target in their allocation decisions, and how
the allocation of resources and repression interact. Another important topic that is
not yet resolved in the literature concerns one of the ways how governments gener-
ate revenues, i.e. taxes. Independent of the type of government, the power to levy
and collect taxes is taken for granted by most citizens around the world – and in
theoretical models in the economics literature. However, in reality, countries differ
in their ability to do so, but we cannot explain why this is the case. Last, there
is a growing interest in the way in which governments actively shape their citizen’s
beliefs and attitudes. The circumstances under which this endeavor is successful are
not clear, and warrant further study.
This thesis consists of three chapters that turn to German history as a fruitful
ground to empirically examine these questions. There is a “plethora of Germanies”
(Emslie, 2015, p. 2), and, as German history has taken many turns, these Germa-
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nies were governed by different types of governments that faced different incentives
and had different objectives. In the three Chapters of this thesis, I turn to three
different periods in history, during which Germany was ruled by different regimes.
Chapter 1 looks at the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and provides the first
empirical evidence on the allocation of resources and tools of repressions, and their
interactions, in an autocratic regime. Chapter 2 turns to the Holy Roman Empire in
the Middle Ages which was characterized by a large number of small, independent
territories competing against each other. It traces the reasons for and effects of the
introduction of the earliest form of fiscal administration. Last, Chapter 3 focuses
on the American and British zones of occupation in West Germany after World
War II to examine the circumstances necessary for externally imposed government
programs to alter the beliefs of a population.
In addition to sharing the focus on episodes from German history, all three chapters
draw on extensive novel datasets for the empirical analysis. Chapter 1 builds on
administrative data that was collected in the GDR and after its demise, as well as
on information collected by military historians. Data are at the municipality level,
and thus enable an unprecedented fine-grained look at the workings of the GDR.
The empirical analysis of Chapter 2 is based on detailed information on the history
of cities and territories that was collected by regional historians. Working with
geographic information systems, we are able to project these data across space and
to generate novel maps of territorial expansion and retraction. Furthermore, city
level information allow us to study micro level processes that are linked to changes
at the territory level. Chapter 3 employs historical data from various archives and
handbooks as well as information from online maps on current day street naming
patterns. Using this data, we are able to study the persistence of beliefs at the
municipality level, taking into account regional variation in the implementation of
the denazification program.
In Chapter 1, I examine how an autocratic regime allocates resources and tools of
2
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repression towards areas that have shown opposition against the ruling regime. I
argue that autocratic regimes face a trade-off: allocating resources to opposition
areas increases the popularity of the regime among the opposition, but at the same
time increases the incentive to engage in behavior that signals opposition, such as
protesting. Allocating tools of repression, on the other hand, decreases the popu-
larity of the regime, but also decreases the incentive to signal opposition. To proxy
opposition, I look at the occurrence of protests during a country-wide uprising in the
GDR in 1953 and examine differential allocation of resources and repression in areas
that engaged in protests. Before these protests, construction and military presence
did not differ in municipalities that would and municipalities that would not protest.
After the uprising, protest-municipalities experience an increase in construction per
capita and in the number of military troops. Protests, of course, did not occur
randomly, and I address this concern by ruling out alternative explanations. I show
that the differences in construction after 1953 are not driven by differences in the
need for residential construction, or the share of construction or industry workers in
1950. Differences in the number of military troops after 1953 cannot be explained by
distance to West Germany, historical military presence or the presence of Soviet mil-
itary troops in protest municipalities. Construction increases after the introduction
of (additional) military troops in municipalities, which is not driven by construction
for military personnel. This suggests that the GDR regime used construction as a
tool to alleviate the negative effect on popularity that military troops had.
In addition to expanding our understanding of the political economy of one particular
autocracy, this chapter broadens our understanding of autocracies, and the trade-
offs they face, more generally. Usually when we think of autocratic regimes, we are
more likely to associate them with the use of repression when facing their opposition.
However, this Chapter shows that autocratic regimes target their opposition also
with resources, and that this could be driven by the desire to alleviate the negative
effect repression has on the regime’s popularity.
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In Chapter 2, Davide Cantoni, Matthias Weigand, and I trace the rise of fiscal ca-
pacity in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. We compare our findings to
predictions from the theoretical literature, which argues that threat of war allows
governments to introduce fiscal institutions to finance military investments that pro-
tect their population. These institutions allow territories to survive and experience
more economic growth. We analyze the causes and effects of the introduction of
so-called Chambers as a first step towards a professionalized fiscal administration.
Chambers were centralized, permanent institutions that were in charge of collect-
ing and organizing revenues. They were introduced in some territories of the Holy
Roman Empire between the late 15th and 18th century. In line with predictions
from the theoretical literature we find that territories are more likely to centralize if
other centralized territories exist in their vicinity and if they are exposed to a more
bellicose environment. Centralized territories are less likely to vanish and are larger
than non-centralized territories as a result, even after taking into consideration con-
stant differences in the size of territories that eventually centralize. They invest
more in administration and military, however, additional investments into military
are not spread equally across centralized territories, but instead are limited to core
cities of territories. There is no additional construction in peripheral cities after
they become part of a centralized territory. This conflicts with the key assumption
of many models that military investments of states are public goods and that thus
all inhabitants of a territory can profit from them and are willing to finance their
provision.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold. First, we document the patterns of
territorial expansion and retraction within the Holy Roman Empire in great detail,
and in doing so add to the understanding of European history during the time
of the rise of Europe. Second, we collect a number of outcomes which quantify
fiscal centralization and its drivers and consequences. Third, we use these data to
empirically examine what causes fiscal centralization, and fourth study its effects.
4
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In doing so, we confirm a large number of predictions from the theoretical literature
on the origins and effects of fiscal capacity. However, we also show that one of the
core assumptions of many models – that investments into the military are a public
good – do not hold in the Holy Roman Empire.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth. We examine
when government programs are successful in altering the beliefs of their constituents
in the context of denazification in Germany after World War II. The denazifica-
tion program aimed at removing National Socialist ideology and in particular anti-
Semitism among Germans. The policies implemented to achieve this goal differed
across occupation zones, and we compare the effectiveness of the American and the
British approach. The American occupation government pursued a highly ambitious
and punitive program which punished many Germans, and which was perceived as
being harsher to minor perpetrators than to major ones. British authorities on the
other hand followed a more pragmatic approach to denazification and mostly focused
on major perpetrators, in many cases neglecting to look at minor ones. We show
that there is a persistence of anti-Semitism in the former American zone, but not
in the former British zone. We explore three potential channels that potentially ex-
plain this pattern by looking at within zone variations: differences in the harshness
of punishment of individual Germans, cooperation of the local administration with
denazification directives, and emphasis on collective guilt. We only find evidence
in line with the first potential channel; harsher punishments during denazification
seem to explain why denazification in the US zone was less successful.
The findings of Chapter 3 help us understand why in some cases government inter-
ventions aiming at changing the beliefs of citizens fail. Countering anti-Semitism
is one example of a belief that governments are actively trying to influence, even
today. The number of anti-Semitic incidents is on the rise in Europe, and govern-
ments around the EU are currently discussing potential policies to tackle this (The
Economist, 2019). The findings of Chapter 3 suggest that the way in which these
5
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policies are designed have a large effect on their effectiveness. Policies that are per-
ceived as being too harsh by the population can have converse effects, and increase
anti-Semitism, instead of lowering it.
Each of the following three self-contained chapters is followed by an Appendix which
contains supplementary materials. References are presented in a consolidated bibli-
ography at the end of the thesis.
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1 | Carrots and Sticks: Targeting the
Opposition in an Autocratic Regime
[O]ne ought to be both feared and loved.
Machiavelli (1513)
To stay in power, autocratic regimes must ensure that they are not overthrown by
their opposition in the population. They possess two main policy levers to achieve
this: carrots, in the form of increases in citizens’ welfare, and sticks, in the form
of repression. However, these two tools are associated with trade-offs, and it is not
clear how autocratic rulers can overcome these: while using carrots to buy off the
opposition increases the regime’s popularity, this policy also signals that engaging in
opposition against the government is beneficial. Targeting the opposition with sticks
decreases the opposition’s ability to overthrow the regime, but at the same time
increases their discontent with the government and thus the willingness to engage
in opposition behavior. One potential way to solve this dilemma could be to employ
carrots and sticks at the same time, as has already been suggested some 500 years
ago by Machiavelli (1513). This way, autocratic leaders could distribute carrots
to raise their popularity without increasing incentives for citizens to oppose the
regime. So far, we only have a very limited understanding to what degree autocratic
regimes target the opposition with carrots and sticks. The existing literature has
mostly focused on the use of either of the two policy levers across countries.1 It
1Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) suggest that when the threat of popular opposition increases,
dictators are more likely to share rents, i.e. use carrots. Desai et al. (2009) provide evidence
7
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has abstracted from potential inter-dependencies between them and their spatial
allocation within countries.
Understanding the political economy of the joint allocation of resources and repres-
sion in autocratic regimes is a highly relevant endeavor. Around half of the world’s
population lived in autocratic regimes in 2017 (The Economist Intelligence Unit,
2017). Historically, the vast majority of people have lived in some form of auto-
cratic regime. If the opposition in autocratic regimes is treated differently than
other groups, this has far-reaching effects on the distribution of welfare within au-
tocratic regimes.
In this paper, I empirically analyze how autocrats target their opposition with car-
rots and sticks in the context of one specific autocratic regime. To do so, I look at
housing construction, military establishments, and the surveillance apparatus at the
municipality level in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), before and after a
wave of protests in 1953. These protests informed the government on where oppo-
sition was located. I find that housing construction and military presence increased
in protest municipalities after protests occurred. Figure 1.1 shows the number of
newly constructed buildings and flats per 1,000 inhabitants from 1946 to 1989.2
Before protests in 1953, per capita construction developed nearly identical in both
groups of municipalities. After some municipalities engaged in protests, they sub-
sequently experience higher levels of construction until 1989. In addition, protest
municipalities are more likely to receive military units in particular after the estab-
that carrots and political influence are negatively related, in line with the “authoritarian bargain”
theory. Davenport (2007b) analyses how the use of sticks differs across different forms of autocratic
regimes instead of the decision on their allocation. Gregory et al. (2011) argue that if a regime
does not have precise information on who opposes the regime, they use more sticks. For a broad
overview of the literature on repression refer to Davenport (2007a). There are some papers that
look at both carrots and sticks. Wintrobe (1990) provides a rational choice model where dictators
choose carrots and sticks based on their costs. Another paper that looks at both policy levers is
the theoretical framework provided in Gerschewski (2013). He looks at legitimization that can be
driven by provision of carrots, repression and co-optation of relevant elites, and how they influence
each other. However, both papers do not address the question who is targeted by carrots and
sticks within a country.
2In this paper, I restrict the analysis to municipalities that had between 2,000 and 10,000
inhabitants in 1950. The graph with all municipalities that I can match is shown in the appendix
(Figure A.1).
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Figure 1.1: Flat Construction per Capita at the Municipality Level
Note The figure shows average construction of flats per 1,000 inhabitants in protest and non-
protest municipalities for all municipalities that have between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants in
1950. The vertical line indicates the year 1952. Data sources: see text.
lishment of the military in 1956, and are more likely to have any Stasi objects in
1989. Before the official establishment of the military, future protests do not predict
where para-military units are located before 1953. After 1953, protest municipalities
receive much more military units than would be predicted given their observables
until 1989.
I link the timing of the arrival of military troops in a municipality to residential
construction to study the interaction of carrots and sticks. I show that all munici-
palities see an increase in residential construction at the time sticks are introduced,
but this does not explain the difference between protest and non-protest munici-
palities. This increase is not driven by residential construction for military troops
themselves. Thus, this paper provides novel evidence that autocratic regimes jointly
target carrots and sticks towards the opposition, and that they use carrots as a tool
to alleviate the negative effect of sticks.
9
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Construction activity, the military apparatus and surveillance in the GDR offer an
ideal setting to study the allocation decisions of non-democratic regimes for three
main reasons:
First, new residential housing and the allocation of military units are good measures
of the allocation of carrots and sticks in the context of the GDR. Lack of adequate
housing was one of the main complaints of citizens to the government throughout the
GDR’s existence. Thus, studying the construction of residential buildings focuses
on one exemplary allocation that was highly welfare relevant. The National People’s
Army (NPA), the GDR’s military, was regarded by the government as a potential
force against the citizens.3 The military is one of the most extreme measures of
repression governments can turn to. Thus, the allocation of military units provides
a measure of where the government targeted potentially violent means against their
citizens. Complementing this with information on the location of Stasi objects at the
end of the GDR also provides insights into a second important stick in the context
of the GDR.
Second, the history of the GDR provides us with a wave of protests in 1953 which
elicited the location of the opposition to the government (and the econometrician).
In the setting of authoritarian states, where people usually hide their opposition
to the government in fear of retaliation, protests can be seen as an information
signal on local discontent (see for example Lorentzen, 2013, for the case of China).
The uprising thus presents a signal about the spatial location of opposition to the
government. There have been no other large scale protests until 1989, so that these
protests continued to provide an important information signal for a long time.
The third reason relates to data availability and trustworthiness. Non-democratic
regimes often do not publish reliable information on themselves. I collected a novel,
extensive dataset on the municipality level from numerous sources that overcomes
3In contrast to other settings where there would be positive spillover effects on the surrounding
economy by the military, this is not a concern here. The GDR’s planned, Socialist economy
guaranteed full employment throughout the country, and military units did not increase local
living standards.
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this problem. Data on housing and military units in the GDR were collected ret-
rospectively by statistical offices of the Federal Republic of Germany and military
historians after the GDR ceased to exist. I supplement this data with novel infor-
mation on housing needs, population, and occupation structure at the municipality
level, which I have collected from internal archival materials of the Statistical Office
of the GDR. During the existence of the GDR, only a selected group of bureaucrats
had access to this information.4 Furthermore, I add information on the location of
objects of the Secret Police, the Stasi, at the municipality level in 1989 that has not
been used for empirical analysis so far.
This paper relates to the theoretical and empirical literature on what drives the allo-
cation of resources in autocratic regimes.5 Empirical studies for autocratic settings
are rare due to the data concerns discussed above. Lazarev and Gregory (2003) ana-
lyze the allocation of vehicles in Soviet Russia in the 1930s. Examining requests for
cars and the decisions of the allocation commission, they find evidence in line with
a political gift exchange model. Closest to the analysis in this paper is Thomson
(2017), who also looks at the reactions of the GDR government to the Uprising of
1953. Thomson’s paper focuses on the power struggle between hard and soft-liners
within the ruling elite. He finds that there is no correlation between protest activity
and food allocation afterwards at the level of counties (Kreise), but protest counties
seem to receive more unofficial Stasi informants after 1953. While the two papers
look at the Uprising of 1953, they differ in their methodology and focus. My paper
studies allocation at a much finer level, municipalities instead of counties, extends
from 1946 until 1989 and covers the whole area of the GDR. Housing, in contrast
to food, was scarce in the GDR, and citizens regularly complained about the hous-
4Most of the statistical material collected in the GDR was never published. Consensus is
that data intended for internal use are of high quality, as it formed the basis of policy decisions
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999, p. 28)
5There is a much larger literature on the allocation of resources in democracies. This literature
focuses on how governments try to increase their chances of reelection and their election shares.
It is not clear from a theoretical viewpoint whether they want to target their supporters or swing
voters. Empirically, there is also no unequivocal evidence. Some papers find that swing voters
receive larger allocations (Johansson, 2003), others that loyal voters receive larger allocations
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006), others both (Case, 2001).
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ing situation. Looking at the location of military troops measures a more extreme
form of a stick. This stick could be used to stop any potential future protests that
threaten the regime. The Uprising of 1953 was stopped by Soviet military troops,
and made it apparent to the GDR government that without control over military
troops they might be overthrown.6 In addition, my paper is able to empirically elicit
how carrots react to the existence of sticks.
This paper also links to the growing literature on the political economy of autocracies
that focuses on the constraints and incentives faced by dictators. Wintrobe (1990,
1998) models the behavior of dictators according to a rational choice model. He
argues that dictators can use repression and loyalty to ensure that they stay in
power, and choose the optimal mix of these two approaches based on the trade-offs
they face.7 Gershenson and Grossman (2001) examine the case of the Soviet Union,
where cooptation into the ruling party was used as a carrot, and how this reacts to
external and internal threats. Guriev and Treisman (2018) focus on how autocracies
can survive without the use of mass repression. Lorentzen (2013) provides a model
in which autocratic regimes allow protests to occur – as long as these protests do not
threaten the regime – to get information on grievances held by the the population
and on the performance of lower level bureaucrats. In addition, he provides empirical
evidence on this channel in China. I add to the understanding in this literature by
demonstrating how carrots and sticks can be used simultaneously in an autocratic
regime, and who is targeted by these.
Last, this paper is related to the literature looking at the effects of protests on
policy outcomes in non-democracies. Aidt and Franck (2015) show that protests
also matter when protesters do not have voting rights, as elites fear for their power
and are thus willing to make policy concessions. There is also evidence that protests
have an effect on the perceived value of firms (Acemoglu et al., 2018) or property
6Information on the allocation of food and the location of Stasi informants is not available on
the municipality level.
7Other influential papers modelling the behavior of autocrats include, but are not limited to,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Olson (1993), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
12
Carrots and Sticks
prices (Collins and Margo, 2007). This paper provides evidence that protests have
twofold effects: they lead to an allocation of carrots and sticks.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.1 gives a short
overview over the historical background of construction activity, the military and
protests in the GDR. Section 1.2 introduces the data and their sources employed
in the empirical analysis. Section 1.3 explains the empirical framework, and the
results first for carrots, i.e. construction, and then sticks, i.e. military and Stasi
presence, and their interaction. Section 1.4 discusses potential channels and section
1.5 concludes.
1.1 Historical Background
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded in the Soviet occupation zone
in Germany after World War II. It existed until 1989/90, and spanned the eastern
part of Germany except for West Berlin. The GDR was an authoritarian, socialist
country with a centrally planned economy. The ruling party was the Socialist Unity
Party of Germany, called SED. The administration of the GDR was organized hier-
archical. The smallest administrative unit were municipalities (Gemeinden), which
were in turn subordinate to counties (Kreise), which were subordinate to regional
districts (Bezirke).
1.1.1 Uprising of 1953
A wave of protests in 1953 had extensive impacts on the subsequent history of the
GDR. The so-called Uprising of 1953 began in Berlin with a strike against an increase
in working hours on June 16th 1953. While the rise in working hours was taken back
on the same day, people engaged in protests in more than 700 municipalities over
the next days. Around 10 percent of the population took part, making this the
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largest instance of protest activity in the history of the GDR. The ensuing protests
were no longer linked to working hours, instead protesters had a variety of demands,
such as reunification, democracy and higher living standards (Kowalczuk, 2003). In
some cities, protesters could only be stopped by Soviet troops and tanks, and there
were at least 55 casualties.
Ruling SED elites were completely taken by surprise by these events. They were
especially shocked that many (industrial) workers – i.e. those people that the govern-
ment claimed it was representing – had shown their discontent with the government.
After the protests, the government began to follow a carrot and stick approach to
prevent a second uprising (Diedrich et al., 1998, p. 202). The regime began to
focus on raising living standards, for example by increasing residential construction,
while at the same timing also starting to build up an extensive security apparatus,
for example by founding the National People’s Army or increasing the size of the
secret police. Until 1989 there were no other large scale, country wide protests in
the GDR.
1.1.2 Housing in the GDR
After World War II, around 10 percent of the housing stock in the GDR was de-
stroyed. In the first post-war years there was only little construction, instead the
government expropriated home owners to assign new residents to their houses and
tried to (provisionally) repair destroyed flats. Authorities could ban migration to
municipalities in which housing was too scarce, but even outside of such municipal-
ities, every change of flats within or across municipalities required state approval.
Since 1949 the Ministry for Reconstruction (Ministerium für Aufbau) was in charge
of planning, running and controlling residential construction, which included the
construction material industry and construction companies. In 1952, the Ministry
also took over leadership over the local construction authorities of the Regional Dis-
trict Councils (Räte der Bezirke). After the Uprising of 1953, the Regional District
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Councils were in charge of drafting plans on residential housing investment and con-
struction decisions, while the economic leadership in East-Berlin decided which of
these plans to implement. All decisions on the allocation of housing were made on
the local level, i.e. in counties and municipalities. The government also started to
promote individual, private construction via subsidies around this time, but most
government support went into state-led construction by cooparatives of workers,
employees, and farmers (Melzer and Steinbeck, 1993, p. 16).
Over time, local institutions were equipped with more decision-making power. Local
building authorities were established in 1958. The central government set overall
target numbers of construction and decided on centers of construction, and local
administrative organs then planned and oversaw residential construction programs
on a day-to-day basis. Counties decided on how to allocate the construction tar-
gets across municipalities within their county (for more information see Melzer and
Steinbeck, 1993; Buck, 2004).8
Figure 1.2 shows aggregate flat construction from 1946 to 1989 based on the data
used in this paper. After the end of World War II, construction of flats increased
until 1950, dropped and then remained relatively constant until 1958. In 1951 the
first five year plan of the GDR was implemented, which laid out target construction
levels until 1956. Aggregate construction could thus not be raised directly after the
Uprising of 1953. Construction levels increase in 1958, when the second five year
plan was introduced with some delay. After 1961, the year in which the Berlin Wall
was erected, flat construction declined until 1970. In 1970 the government launched
a comprehensive housing construction program to solve the problem of housing
shortages until 1990. Construction of flats increased until 1981, after which a new
8This division of responsibilities was enforced in reality. Materials for construction were only
given out by districts and counties, not by central authorities. In a meeting of functionaries involved
in rural construction the provision of building materials by central institutions instead of local ones
is rejected: “Regional districts and counties decide on the way of allocating construction materials.
[...] Therefore we adhere to our principle that the allocation of construction material is not made
by the Ministry for Reconstruction, but only by the regional districts and counties. The authority
of the regional organs must not be undermined, but has to be raised systematically.” (Ministerium
für Aufbau, 1957, p. 17f, own translation).
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five year plan began to prioritize exports. Consequently, all domestic investments,
including those in housing, were cut.
Figure 1.2: Overall Flat Construction
Note Overall new flat construction (all types) from 1946 to 1989. Data is from the building
and flat census of 1995 (Gebäude- und Wohnungszählung), which was conducted by the Statistical
Offices of the German Federal States in former East Germany.
In 1989 before the breakdown of the GDR, officials admitted that the GDR would
not be able to reach their ambitious goal of solving the housing crisis until 1990.
They also recognized that only two thirds of all planned construction until 1990
had been undertaken so far. There were several reasons for this. Actual construc-
tion lagged behind official plans due to a lack of construction materials. State-led
construction had priority over the renovation of existing buildings and private con-
struction, which led to a further deterioration of the housing stock and made the
scarcity of housing and the emerging low living standards even worse (Melzer and
Steinbeck, 1993, p. 11, Bouvier, 2002, p. 158). The lack of construction had large
effects on people’s satisfaction with the regime: throughout time the largest share
of citizens’ petitions (around one third) to the government related to the housing
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situation (Buck, 2004, p. 258f).9 The government was acutely aware that the lack of
(adequate) housing influenced people’s opinion of the government.10 There is also
evidence that the government tried to alleviate housing concerns of opponents of
the regime. A report from the administration of the regional district Berlin from
1981 discussed the difficulties of finding a flat in the GDR as a driving factor of
petitions of GDR citizens who wanted to resettle to West Germany. Even though
people who wanted to relocate to the West were seen as opponents of the GDR, the
administration elaborately discussed how to solve the underlying housing issues and
organized new flats for petitioners wherever possible.
1.1.3 The National People’s Army
After World War II, East Germany was demilitarized and initially banned from
establishing an army. Re-militarization first started indirectly in 1949 with the es-
tablishment of police units that secretly had a military character, and that were
in 1952 transformed into so-called barracked police units (Kasernierte Volkspolizei).
These were highly armed, barracked police units, that only differed from real army
units through their label. When the National People’s Army (NPA) was officially
founded in 1956, these barracked police units were immediately renamed and incor-
porated into the NPA.
The experience of the Uprising of 1953 also shaped the development of the military.
The military was seen as one part of the security apparatus that could be targeted
against the population. At the end of June 1953, the para-military baracked police
units were assigned more resources to increase their size and effectiveness. In the
next year, the politburo presented plans with measures that armed forces should
9These petitions were basically letters of complaints to the government. Unfortunately, the
petitions were not collected and thus no longer exist today.
10An internal report of the Secret Police, the Stasi, commented that after the discontinuation of
a local construction project in 1962 that “people had lost confidence in the workers’ and farmers’
state” and that as a result some people wanted to leave for West Germany as there they “would
be able to build.” (see Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (1962, p. 3), own translation.)
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take against the population in case of internal unrest. The pattern of introducing
structures for the use of armed forces against GDR citizens continued with the
official foundation of the military in 1956.11 Especially in the early years until the
1960s, the NPA focused much more on internal – as opposed to external – threats.
Nevertheless, the military always continued to play an important role in internal
security considerations until the end of the GDR. For example, when protest activity
in 1989 began to spread across the country, the government discussed the potential
involvement of military troops (which it then decided against).
Unlike in other settings, regions in the GDR were not keen on attracting army
facilities. During the entire existence of the GDR, not a single municipality or city
ever tried to attract military establishments. There were only very few people who
benefited from military establishments economically, while for most people they just
provided an economic and social burden (Kersten et al., 2011, p. 36). In addition,
citizens were very likely aware that the government saw the military as a potential
tool against its citizens.
1.2 Data
Data on authoritarian regimes are often unavailable or not trustworthy.12 This
makes it very difficult to empirically study authoritarian regimes. These concerns
also apply to the GDR, where official residential construction statistics for example
counted every space in a nursing and elderly home as a flat (see Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 1993, p. 6). To overcome this challenge, I rely on data that were collected
retrospectively after the fall of the GDR, and data that were collected for internal
purposes only.
11For a more detailed dicussion on the Uprising of 1953 and its effects on the military refer to
Diedrich et al. (1998).
12Hollyer et al. (2011) for example find that non-democracies are less likely to disclose policy-
relevant data and Magee and Doces (2015) provide evidence that they overstate their growth rates.
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1.2.1 Data Sources
Residential Construction and Housing Demand
Data on residential construction are from the building and flat census of 1995
(Gebäude- und Wohnungszählung), which was conducted by the Statistical Offices
of the German Federal States in former East Germany. The census includes every
residential building and flat existing in 1994.13 A residential building is defined as
a building of which at least half of its area is used as living space. A flat is de-
fined as any number of co-joined rooms used as living space, which have their own
entrance (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). Data on buildings include information
on the construction year, ownership structure in 1990, and the prevalent heating
system in the building. Flat data additionally include the number of rooms and
information on the size of flats. Using the information on the year of construction, I
am able to create a municipality-year panel of construction. To make the data more
comparable between urban and rural areas where the number of living units within
a building might differ, I focus on the flat data. I classify all flats that were labeled
as being privately owned in 1990 as private, and all flats that were labeled as either
municipal, public property, belonging to workers’ and charitable socialist building
cooperative societies, agricultural production cooperatives or were state-owned as
state flats.
I normalize construction levels by population size measured in thousands. My
dataset includes population data for 1946, 1950, 1964, and 1971. 1946 popula-
tion data are from Falter (1999) and 1964 population data are from publications of
official GDR statistics (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, 1966). Popula-
tion data from 1950 and 1971 are from archived internal records of the Statistical
Office, which I digitized.14 Based on the available years I interpolate and extrapolate
13To the best of my knowledge the demolition of buildings in the former GDR only started with
the funding program for city redevelopment East (Förderprogramm Stadtumbau Ost) in 2002.
14These records are available at the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. The population census
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population years linearly for all other years.15
I also collected measures of housing demand at the municipality level around 1953:
war destruction in Saxony (one region of the GDR) in 194516, and the number of
available flats and the number of households looking for flats from the flat demand
census in January 1954.17
Military units and Stasi presence
Information on military units in the GDR come from Kersten et al. (2011), who
provide information on the history of military establishments in East Germany.
From this I generate a municipality-year level panel with information on the location
and foundation year of National People’s Army units, the presence of barracked
police establishments and Soviet military troops, as well as the historic presence of
Wehrmacht establishments.18 I supplement this with information from an historical
account on the barracked police (Diedrich and Wenzke, 2001), a location database on
the National People’s Army and the Soviet forces by the Military History Research
Institute (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt)19, and the online catalog of the
Military Archive in Germany20.
As a second measure of a stick in the GDR, I turn to the presence of the secret
1950 can be found in the records DE/2/22320-DE/2/33232 and the 1971 population census in the
records DE/2/33057-DE/2/33062.
15Population data for 1990 would also be available at the municipality level. However, these
numbers show population after the introduction of freedom of movement. If people from areas
with and without opposition left the area of the former GDR at different rates, this would then
bias the interpolated population estimates after 1971. If the extrapolation of population generates
a negative population value, I set this to 0.
16From the record DH/1/45781 at the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichtenfelde.
17The survey provides a snapshot of the situation on January 31st, 1954, i.e. around half a year
after protests took place. Unfortunately no comparable information is available for the time before
June 1953. I assume that there have been no large changes between June 1953 and January 1954.
The records are available at the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde DE/2/1-13.
18Unfortunately the foundation year is not included for every military unit. I thus exclude these
units from my empirical analysis.
19The database can be accessed under http://www.mgfa.de/html/standorte_einleitung.php
(last visited January 23, 2018).
20The catalog can be accessed under https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/basys2-invenio/
login.xhtml (last visited January 23, 2018).
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police of the GDR, known as the Stasi. Detailed information on Stasi activity over
time at the municipality level is not available. I use data on the presence of Stasi
objects at the municipality level in 1989 as a proxy for overall Stasi presence. These
information are from a list of all former Stasi objects that were dissolved in 1990
that was published in a German newspaper in June 1990 (taz, 1990). Objects can
be differentiated according to whether they were public, such as office buildings that
were known to belong to the Stasi, or disguised, e.g. in the case of flats that were
used for secret meetings.
Protest Data
I interpret the incidence of protest activity as a signal that some opposition exists
within a municipality.21 Data on protests in 1953 are from Kowalczuk (2003), who
provides a list of 698 places for which either a protest, demonstration, strike or
violence against individual persons or institutions between the 16th and 21st of
June 1953 is documented. Based on this, I generate a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if some form of protest occurred within a municipality. Kowalzcuk
notes that while it is likely that all places with at least 10,000 inhabitants which
experienced some form of protest are included, the same cannot be said for places
with a lower number of inhabitants. This exclusion of smaller municipalities is likely
to be random, and will therefore just have an effect on the precision of the estimates.
Figure 1.3 presents the location of all protests that I could match distinctly to a
municipality. Overall, I can match protests to 494 municipalities according to 1997
boundaries (see more on this below).22
21This is similar to Lichter et al. (2016), where differences in riot intensity in the GDR on the
county level are used as a proxy for the strength of the opposition, or Lorentzen (2013) where the
Chinese government uses local protest activity as an information signal about which social groups
oppose the government.
22I am currently assembling an additional dataset on the centers of protest activity.
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Figure 1.3: Protests during the Uprising of 1953
Note In this map of the German Democratic Republic, each circle denotes a municipality that had
a protest event during the Uprising of 1953. This encompasses protests, demonstrations, strikes, or
violence against individual persons or institutions between the 16th and 21st of June 1953. Data
is from Kowalczuk (2003). The hollow white area is Berlin, which is excluded from the analysis.
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Other variables
Additional variables are the voting shares for different parties in 1946, the last free
election in the GDR, from Falter (1999). I collected information from job censuses for
the years 1950 and 1971 from archival records.23 In addition, I collected information
on the names and years in office of Chairmen of the County Councils by contacting
all relevant county archives,24 and enhancing this with information from historical
literature, historical newspapers, and Wikipedia articles.
Municipality Borders
The empirical analysis is conducted at the municipality level according to the mu-
nicipality borders in 1997.25 Using information provided by the National Statistical
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995) and the Statistical Offices of the Federal
States26 all municipalities were aggregated according to their 1997 boundaries. I
exclude all municipalities which had given up some parts of their area between 1948
and 1997 when I could not precisely identify which areas this included. I also ex-
clude the municipalities that received this land.27 Overall, I have information on
approximately 5,000 municipalities out of 5,792 municipalities that existed in East
Germany in 1997.
1.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics. In my empirical analysis, I restrict the sample
to municipalities that had between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants in 1950. This makes
the treatment and control group more comparable, as protests in 1953 were more
23Data of the job census 1950 do not span the entire GDR, as some of the archival records were of
such bad quality that they could not be accessed. For some municipalities it was also not possible
to get information on all sectors for the same reason. It can be assumed that this is random.
24I contacted all 69 county archives, that I could identify, of which 57 replied.
251997 is the first year for which official geocoded maps with municipality borders exist.
26Anna Gumpert and Nadja Dwenger kindly shared this information with me.
27This affects mostly large municipalities and cities.
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likely to occur in larger municipalities. Around 200 municipalities in this restricted
dataset experience a protest, slightly more than 750 do not experience a protest.28
Before 1953, overall, state-led and private construction per 1,000 inhabitants was not
statistical significantly different from each other in protest and non-protest munici-
palities. Each year around 1.4 flats were built in protest municipalities and around
1.3 in non-protest municipalities. After 1953, overall and state-led construction is
higher in protest municipalities; overall construction is 3.3 flats per 1,000 inhabi-
tants in protest municipalities, and 2.4 flats in non-protest municipalities, state-led
construction accounts to 3.1 flats per 1,000 inhabitants in protest municipalities and
2.4 flats per 1,000 inhabitants in non-protest municipalities. There is no difference
in private construction before and after protests occurs.
Before protests occurred, protest and non-protest municipalities were equally likely
to host any barracked police units. Protest municipalities are more likely to ever
house any military units. This changes after protests occur. 10 percent of all protest
municipalities ever house any military units, 5 percent of all non-protest municipal-
ities ever house any military units. The average number of troops that are stationed
in a municipality in each year is larger in protest than in non-protest municipalities
(0.12 compared to 0.06 troops). These differences are statistical significantly differ-
ent at the 1 percent level. They are also more likely to have any secret Stasi objects
in 1990 (around 40 percent of all protest municipalities have a secret Stasi object,
and around 25 percent of non-protest municipalities have a secret Stasi object), but
there is no difference in whether they have public Stasi objects.
Protest and non-protest municipalities differ in their observables. Protest municipal-
ities have a larger population in 1946, 1950, 1964 and 1971 – even after restricting
the sample to municipalities between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants. In 1950, protest
municipalities had on average 4,915 inhabitants and non-protest municipalities had
3,943 inhabitants. The working population in 1950 was larger in protest compared
28When including places with fewer than 2,000 and more than 10,000 inhabitants, there are
around 500 protest municipalities and 4,550 non-protest municipalities.
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to non-protest municipalities. The share of votes for the SED in 1946 was larger
in non-protest municipalities (0.461 compared to 0.444). Around 2 percent of the
population in protest municipalities was looking for a flat in 1954, compared to 1.8
percent in non-protest municipalities. Protest municipalities were also around 30
km closer to Berlin, but 12 km further away from any external border of the GDR.
The share of construction workers and industry workers in 1950 is not statistically
significantly different from each other. The differences pointed out here will be
incorporated in the empirical strategy and the robustness checks.
1.3 Empirical Framework and Results
In this section, I will first discuss where protests occur, before I estimate the effect
of protests on construction as well as military and Stasi presence at the municipality
level.
1.3.1 Where Do Protests Occur?
Protest activity did not occur randomly within the GDR, and this could potentially
bias the results of the following empirical analysis. Protests might be correlated
with other factors than opposition to the government that influence construction
and military presence after 1953. To test which variables predict protest activity I
estimate the simple linear OLS model
Protestm = β1Population1953,m + β2Controlsm + αd + m (1.1)
where Protestm is a dummy indicating protest activity in 1953 in municipality m,
Population1953,m is population in the year 1953 in m and Controlsm are different
controls accounting for potential differences in location, political preferences, pop-
ulation growth, industry structure, housing demand or military presence between
25
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protest and non-protest municipalities. αd are county fixed effects according to
county borders in 1953. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.29
Table 1.2 presents the results of this linear probability model. All regressions control
for population in 1953 – which is correlated with protests at the 1 percent level in
all specifications – and county fixed effects. In column 1, I examine the location of
protests. Municipalities that are closer to Berlin are more likely to have protests
in 1953 (significant at the 10 percent level). As protest activity started in Berlin
and spread from there, this is not surprising. County capitals are also more likely
to have protests in 1953 (significant at 1 percent level), this might be explained by
the fact that county capitals were the center of state activity. They thus provided
protesters with the opportunity to protest visibly for representatives of the regime
they were protesting against. If protesters from surrounding municipalities traveled
to county capitals to protest there, we would expect that distance to county cities
positively predicts the existence of protests, because most likely people from closer
municipalities would be more likely to travel to county capitals instead of protesting
in their home municipality. This does not seem to be the case empirically, there
is no statistically significant relationship between distance to county capitals and
protests at the municipality level. Distance to the West border excluding Berlin
or the county capital do not explain where protests take place. In column 2, I
look at the role of political preferences of the local population. In 1946, the only
democratic election of the GDR took place. Municipalities with higher share of votes
for the SED were more likely (1 percent significance level) and places with a higher
turnout are less likely (5 percent significance level) to protest. This suggests that
protests in 1953 provided the government with new information on the existence
of the opposition, which they could not infer from the election in 1946. Next, I
look at population growth (column 3). If some municipalities grew faster after
World War II, for example because they received more refugees, this might have led
29I run this analysis with all available data, and do not limit the dataset to municipalities that
had between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants in 1950. By doing so I want to ensure that I do not
exclude any potential driver for protests due to a lack of precision of the estimates.
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to discontent among the population. While population in 1953 predicts protests,
protest municipalities did not have a different population growth path from 1946
to 1953. The role of different economic sectors is examined in column 4. Protest
municipalities have a higher share of industrial workers (significant at the 1 percent
level), but do not differ with respect to the share of people working in construction.
An important concern is whether municipalities with a higher demand for housing
were more likely to protest. In columns 5 and 6, I examine to what extent housing
demands are correlated with protests. I first use information on the share of people
searching for a flat in 1954. A larger share of the population searching for a flat
is correlated with more protests in 1953 at the 1 percent significance level (column
5). As a second measure of housing demand, I look at the share of war destruction
in municipalities. This measure is only available for one region within the GDR,
Saxony, and thus the number of observations drops in column 6. There is a positive
relationship that is significant at the 1 percent level between war destruction and
protests (column 6). Columns 5 and 6 thus provide evidence that demand for
residential construction drove protest activity. However, the explanatory power of
these coefficients as measured by the R2 is comparable to that of the other potential
explanatory variables.
Last, I look at the effect of having had some unit or establishment associated with
the barracked police in 1952 in column 7. This would be problematic if the existence
of the barracked police makes protests less likely, and after 1953 places that did not
have any military yet received military troops after the introduction of the NPA.
There is no statistical significant relationship between them. In column 8, I look
at all potential correlates simultaneously (excluding war destruction in Saxony).
Political preferences and distance to Berlin are no longer statistically significantly
correlated with protests in 1953, whereas distance to the West border excluding
Berlin and the existence of barracked police units negatively predicts protests.
The results of this section inform us on important control variables for the main
29
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analysis of this paper. I will examine in turn whether county capitals,30 the share
of workers in industry, demand for housing, and the existence of barracked police
units in 1952 drive the the effect of protests on housing and military presence.
1.3.2 Carrots: Residential Construction
To estimate the effect of protests on construction activity, I employ a difference-in-
differences approach. This approach compares protest to non-protest municipalities,
before and after protests, ceteris paribus. First, I estimate the following simple
difference-in-differences model
Constructionmt = β1Protestm + β2Post1952t + β3Protestm × Post1952t + mt
(1.2)
where Constructionmt measures the number of new flats or buildings per 1,000
inhabitants in municipality m and year t. Protestm is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if a protest occurred in municipality m in 1953. Post1952t is a dummy
for all years after 1952. mt is the error term. In additional specifications I also
include year and municipality fixed effects.
Table 1.3 presents the results of the simple difference in difference estimator out-
lined in equation 1.2.31 Over the entire period under consideration, an additional
0.833 flats per 1,000 inhabitants are built per year in a protest compared to a non-
protest municipality (column 1). This does not seem to be explained by differences
between protest and non-protest municipalities that existed prior to 1953: there is
no difference in construction levels before 1953 (column 2). Protest municipalities
have 0.878 (significant at the 1 percent level) additional flats per 1,000 inhabitants
after 1953 (column 2). To calculate the accumulated difference until 1989, I use
30Especially during the early years of the GDR there were many county reforms, so that the
effect of being a county capital is not captured by municipality fixed effects.
31Results when I include municipalities with fewer than 2,000 or more than 10,000 inhabitants
in 1950 are presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.
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Table 1.3: Carrots: Difference-in-Differences Estimators
Flats per 1,000 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protest 1953 0.833*** 0.095 0.662 0.095
(0.162) (0.120) (3.967) (0.120)
Post 1952 1.030*** 78.003*** 0.528*** 1.030***
(0.078) (2.621) (0.079) (0.079)
Protest 1953 0.878*** 35.313*** 0.671*** 0.878*** 0.878***
× Post 1952 (0.223) (5.611) (0.170) (0.225) (0.223)
Year FEs 3
Municip. FEs 3 3
Observations 41,932 41,932 1,906 1,906 41,932 41,932
Adj. R2 0.003 0.009 0.432 0.064 0.062 0.076
Note Estimation results for equation (1.2) using only municipalities with 2,000 to 10,000 in-
habitants in 1950. The dependent variable is the number of newly constructed flats per 1,000
inhabitants per year and municipality. Protest 1953 is an indicator variable whether any protest
activity occured in the municipality in 1953. Post 1952 is an indicator variable for all years after
1952. Columns (3) and (4) use the methodology suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) and aggre-
gate all pre and post treatment observations for each municipality. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in columns (1), (2), (5),
and (6). Robust standard errors in columns (3) and (4). *, **, and *** denote significance on
the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
the methodology suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). When I aggregate all pre
and post treatment observations for each municipality, protest municipalities have
around 35 additional flats per 1,000 inhabitants after 1952 (column 3) or 0.671 flats
per 1,000 inhabitants per year (column 4). To test whether these results are driven
by municipality or time specific effects, I include municipality fixed effects (column
5), and municipality and time fixed effects (column 6) to the panel analysis. This
does not affect results.32
32We expect coefficients in column 2, 5, and 6 to be identical, because the analysis is based on a
full panel in which treatment occurs at the same point in time for all treated observations. In this
case the coefficient of Protest1953 captures differences in construction of protest and non-protest
municipalities before 1953, which is identical to what the average of municipality fixed effects
across these groups captures. The coefficient of Post1952 includes the difference in construction
after 1953 for municipalities that did not have a protest and the interaction Protest1953×Post1952
the difference in construction of protest municipalities after 1952 compared to before. The mean
of all time fixed effects after 1952 is thus equivalent to the coefficient of Post1952.
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1.3.3 Carrots: Robustness and Heterogenous Effects
The GDR was a socialist country; thus, the government was in control of most of
residential construction. Nevertheless, some private construction existed. If the
increase in construction in protest municipalities is an attempt of the government
to buy off the opposition, we would expect that the effect only occurs for state-led
construction. Therefore, I explore the difference between state and private construc-
tion, controlling for year and municipality fixed effects. State construction increases
by 0.627 flats per 1,000 inhabitants (significant at 1 percent level) in protest mu-
nicipalities after protests (Table 1.4, column 2). There is no statistically significant
effect on private construction (column 3).
Regression model 1.2 does not take into account that there might be differences in
protest and non-protest municipalities that have a different effect on construction
over time. We have seen that the share of households looking for a flat is positively
correlated with protests. Demand for additional housing in the 1950s might increase
construction initially, but this effect might fade out over time. To account for this,
I extend the model to a more generalized approach of the following form
Constructionmt = βProtestm × Post1952t +
1989∑
t=1946
γtControlsm × Y eart
+ αm + αt + mt, (1.3)
where Constructionmt, Protestm, Post1952t and mt are defined as before. αt and
αm represent time and municipality fixed effects respectively. If construction in-
creases for all municipalities after 1952 or protest municipalities have higher con-
struction levels over the whole period under consideration, this will be captured by
the time and municipality fixed effects respectively. Controlsm are a number of
control variables, which I interact with dummies for all years. This allows these
controls to have a different effect over time. The demand for housing in 1953, for
32
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example, could have an impact on construction in the first few years after 1953,
but not in later periods. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to
control for heteroskedasticity and within-municipality correlation over time.
This approach will lead to causal estimates if the common trends assumption holds,
i.e. if protest and non-protest municipalities would have developed in a parallel
fashion in the absence of treatment. Figure 1.1 shows that before 1953 both protest
and non-protest municipalities with 2,000 to 10,000 inhabitants had as good as
identical construction levels per 1,000 inhabitants, and strengthens the credibility
of this assumption.
Protests in 1953 were more likely in municipalities that had a larger need for addi-
tional housing (Table 1.2). If after 1953, the government began to address housing
shortages, and provided housing in the municipalities that had the largest need for
housing, protests would be correlated with an increase in housing, but not because
the government targeted opposition municipalities. Including municipality fixed ef-
fects does not account for this, if the role of the need for housing changes over
time. To test whether demand for housing explains the difference between protest
and non-protest municipalities, I use two different measures for the local demand for
housing. First, I control for the share of households at the municipality level looking
for a flat shortly after protests took place, and second I control for war destruction
on the municipality level.
Column 4 in Table 1.4 controls for the share of households in a municipality looking
for a flat in January 1954 interacted with dummies for all years from 1947 to 1989.
This does not affect the magnitude or significance of the coefficient of protest activity
(0.691, 1 percent significance level). Next, I control for a second measure for the
demand for housing: the share of buildings destroyed in a municipality in 1945. This
data is only available for one area of the GDR, thus the number of observations drops.
Nevertheless, protests are still positively associated with per capita construction.33
33When I estimate the baseline regression just for the municipalities for which I have information
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This shows that even though protests were more likely to occur in municipalities with
more housing shortages, the need for additional housing does not drive the observed
differences in construction after protests occurred. In fact, protest municipalities
see a larger increase in construction than would be predicted based on their need
for additional housing.
Another potential concern is that the self-proclaimed workers’ and farmers’ state
targeted industrial workers for ideological reasons. Since industrial workers were
more likely to protest, this could explain the differences in construction between
protest and non-protest municipalities. We might similarly be worried about con-
struction workers, although Table 1.2 does not show a significant relationship be-
tween the share of construction workers and protests. If this was the case, we would
expect the effect of protests on construction to disappear once we control for the
share of construction or industry workers in 1950 (the closest census year to 1953).
Column 6 shows the effect of protests when controlling for the share of construction
workers, and column 7 when controlling for the share of industry workers. The co-
efficient of interest remains nearly unchanged (0.749 and 0.864) and is significant at
the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. This means, that there is no evidence
suggesting that the increase in construction in protest municipalities was simply the
result of targeting construction or industry workers.
Table 1.5 looks at heterogenous effects for different types of municipalities. In
columns 1 and 2, I distinguish between county captials and all other municipali-
ties. County capitals were likely to have a higher share of government employees or
other people supporting the regime living in them. If the GDR government actually
targeted their supporters who lived in hostile locations, we would expect to see a
larger increase in construction in county capitals.34 However, the results suggest
on war destruction, the coefficient βˆ is 0.748, and significant at the 1 percent level. Controlling for
the share of destroyed buildings thus has no effect on the estimated coefficient.
34This is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Construction in county capitals could also be
larger for other reasons, for example if the government assigns more importance to the opposition
in capital cities, or because it is easier to provide construction in capital cities.
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Table 1.5: Carrots: Heterogeneous Effects
Flats per 1,000 inhabitants
County Capital Dist. West Germany Border Municipality
yes no close not close yes no
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protest 1953 0.515 0.446** 1.075*** 0.793*** 1.205 0.846***
× Post 1952 (1.328) (0.212) (0.307) (0.268) (0.741) (0.233)
Observations 1,348 40,584 28,600 27,500 4,620 37,312
Adj. R2 0.115 0.063 0.079 0.070 0.055 0.078
Note Estimation results for equation (1.2) using only municipalities with 2,000 to 10,000 in-
habitants in 1950 for different sample splits. The dependent variable is the number of newly
constructed flats per 1,000 inhabitants per year and municipality. Protest 1953 is an indicator
variable whether any protest activity occurred in the municipality in 1953. Post 1952 is an in-
dicator variable for all years after 1952. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is split in county
capitals and non-county capitals, respectively. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is split by the
distance to West Germany where municipalities fewer than 50km away from West Germany are
considered close and all others are considered not close. In columns (5) and (6), municipalities
at the border of the GDR and those in the interior of the country are studied separately. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the municipality level reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
that construction only increases in non-county capitals (columns 1 and 2). Thus
the government increased construction in opposition areas that had lower levels of
government supporters. Both protest municipalities that were close to West Ger-
many or further away (less or more than 50 km away from West Germany) see an
increase in construction levels after protests occurred. The increase is higher for
municipalities close to West Germany (1.075, significant at 1 percent level) than
those further away (0.793, significant at 1 percent level), but the difference between
the coefficients is not statistically significant. Geographic location across the border
plays an important role for construction in protest municipalities: border munic-
ipalities did not see an increase in construction if a protest occurred (column 5),
whereas non-border municipalities did (column 6).35
35This pattern does not change before or after the construction of the Berlin Wall.
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Quality of Housing
There are several ways to target a population with flats. Increasing the quantity
of available flats is one way. Another way is to increase the quality of available
housing. I use the information on the features of flats from the flat and building
census to examine how protests affected the quality of housing. New flats in protest
municipalities after 1952 did not have more amenities than in non-protest munici-
palities (table 1.6). There is no effect of protest activity on the share of flats with
modern heating (column 1) or a kitchen (column 2). The share of flats with a toilet
or a bathroom is lower than in non-protest municipalities (columns 3 and 4). In ad-
dition, the share of flats that were of medium size and suited for families increased
(column 7), at the cost of the share of very large appartments (column 8). Lowering
the quality of each individual unit allowed the government to provide more housing
and target a larger number of people.
1.3.4 Sticks: Army Units
One way for the ruling elite to secure its power and to prevent further protests is
to provide the opposition with higher living standards, but this policy also demon-
strates to citizens that it can be beneficial to show opposition against the govern-
ment. Another option is to use (or threaten the use of) state-led violence against the
opposition. In this section, I examine to what extent the GDR government adopted
this second option. I focus on the military, as one component of the security ap-
paratus of the GDR. Throughout the existence of the GDR, the military was seen
as a potential tool to stop internal turmoil. This is a very extreme form of a stick,
which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
I use a difference-in-differences estimator to estimate the effect of protests on the
establishment of military units. Even though the military was officially only estab-
lished in 1956, there were para-military police units before that. I treat these police
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units as military units in my empirical analysis. Thus, I am able to look at the
existence of military units in municipalities from 1949 to 1989.
The model has the following form
MilitaryUnitsmt =β1Protestm + β2Protestm × Post1952t
+ γProtestsWithin10kmm
+ ProtestsWithin10kmm × Post1952t
+ ζNumberNPAtroopsWithin10kmmt
+ δControlsm + αd + αt + mt
(1.4)
where MilitaryUnitsmt measures the number of military units within municipality
m in year t. Protestm is a dummy that takes the value 1 if any protest activity
occurred in municipality m in 1953. Military units are mobile and can be moved,
and I account for the spatial pattern of opposition behavior and military troops.
ProtestsWithin10kmm counts the number of protest municipalities within a 10 km
distance of m and NumberNPAtroopsWithin10kmmt the number of municipalities
with NPA troops within a 10 km distance of m in year t. Controlsmt are controls
at the municipality level. I control for the natural logarithm of population in 1950,
the share of workers in industry in 1946, share of votes for the SED in 1946 (and its
interaction with a post 1952 dummy), distance to any Western border, a dummy for
border municipalities, a dummy for Nazi military presence, distance to the next mu-
nicipality with Nazi military, a dummy for the presence of Soviet military, distance
to the next municipality with Soviet military and a dummy for county capitals. αd
are county fixed effects and αt are time fixed effects. I also consider how results
change when I control for municipality fixed effects instead of county fixed effects.
In this case I drop all controls that do not vary over time. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level in all regressions.
The coefficient of interest in regression 1.4, β2, indicates how many more military
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units exist in a protest municipality in a given year compared to a non-protest mu-
nicipality conditional on all controls. γ captures to what extent the decision whether
to place military in a given municipality is driven by the existence of opposition in
close-by municipalities. ζ captures to what extent the number of military units is
driven by the existence of military units in close-by municipalities.
Results are presented in Table 1.7.36 If the location of protests was not anticipated
by the GDR government, protests should not predict military location before 1953
conditional on municipality characteristics. Column (1) shows protests in 1953 and
the number of protests in a 10 km radius are not correlated with the number of
military troops before 1953 at any conventional significance level. Next, we turn
to the location of military troops after protests occurred. If a municipality was
involved in protests in 1953, it has 0.066 additional troops in each year (significant
at 10 percent level). If there are more protests within a 10 km radius, this decreases
the number of troops in municipality m after 1952, ceteris paribus. The effect of
the number of troops within 10 km, on the other hand, does not have a statistically
significant effect on the number of troops in m. Protest municipalities might have
unobserved characteristics that explain why the number of military troops they host
is larger, and to control for this, results in column 3 are conditional on municipality
fixed effects. Protests are associated with 0.078 more military troops after 1952
in this specification (significant at 5 percent level). Again, the amount of protests
within a 10km radius decreases the number of troops in municipality m, holding
constant the number of military troops that exist in municipalities within a 10 km
radius.
To ensure that these effects really capture a reaction to protest activity, we exploit
that the rationale for establishing military troops differed over time in the GDR.
Until 1961, the military was created as a potential weapon against internal oppo-
sition in case of turmoil. After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, there
36Table A.2 presents results if I also include municipalities with fewer than 2,000 or more than
10,000 inhabitants in 1950.
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Table 1.7: Sticks: Military Units
Number of Military Units
before 1953 1949 – 1989 1949 – 1989 only after 1961
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protest 1953 0.018 0.013 -0.001
(0.013) (0.021) (0.019)
Protest 1953 × 0.066* 0.078**
Post 1952 (0.040) (0.036)
Number Protests -0.002 0.009 -0.004
< 10km (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Number Protests < -0.009** -0.011**
10km × Post 1952 (0.004) (0.004)
Number NPA -0.023* -0.010 0.036* -0.026**
< 10km (0.012) (0.026) (0.021) (0.012)
County FEs 3 3 3
Municipality FEs 3
Year FEs 3 3 3
Observations 3,546 36,490 36,818 24,108
Adj. R2 0.240 0.249 0.740 0.390
Note Estimation results for equation (1.4) using only municipalities with 2,000 to 10,000 in-
habitants in 1950. The dependent variables are the number of military units per municipality
and year that were established in the years indicated in the column title. Column (1) restricts
attention to military establishments until 1952. Columns (2) and (3) incorporate all years from
1949 to 1989. Column (4) looks at the number of military units after 1961 that were established
in municipalities that did not have any military presence prior to 1961. Controls in column 1, 2
and 4 are log of population 1950, the share of workers in industry in 1946, distance to any West-
ern border, a dummy for border municipalities, a dummy for Nazi military presence, distance
to the next municipality with Nazi military and a dummy for county capitals, whether there is
Soviet military in a municipality, distance to the next municipality with Soviet military, share
votes for the SED in 1946, and share votes for the SED interacted with post 1952 (column 2 and
3). In column 3 and 4 I control for population and the number of military units within a 10km
radius. Column 1, 2 and 5 have county fixed effects, column 3 and 4 municipality fixed effects.
All regressions control for year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1
percent level, respectively.
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was a shift: the military began to focus on potential external threats. If military
units were really targeted to protest municipalities, most units should have arrived
between 1953 and 1961. To exclude any path dependency (municipalities that have
troops before 1961, are likely to also have troops after 1961), column 4 regards only
municipalities that did not have any military units until 1961. If these municipalities
see the establishment of military units, this is very unlikely to be the case because
of internal considerations. There is no longer a relationship between protest activity
in 1953 and the number of military units (column 4). Thus, protest municipalities
were only targeted by military troops in the time frame during which considerations
about internal warfare dominated military location decisions, but not once consid-
erations about external warfare play a role. This does not mean that after 1963
military troops became irrelevant as a tool to secure internal stability, as the stock
of military troops that targeted to protest municipalities before 1963 continues to
exist. Overall, the evidence in this section suggests that the GDR targeted protest
municipalities after 1953 with military units to ensure stability of the regime.
1.3.5 Sticks: Stasi Presence
Next, I turn to a second measure of a stick: the secret police in the GDR, known as
the Stasi. Unfortunately, no information on Stasi presence at the municipality level
over time is available. However, I am able to examine the location of Stasi objects
in protest and non-protest municipalities in 1989 with a novel dataset. Using this
information, I estimate the following model
StasiPresencem = βProtestm + γControlsm + αd + m, (1.5)
where StasiPresencem is a dummy indicating whether there has been any, any pub-
lic or any secret Stasi presence in municipality m in 1989. Protestsm is a dummy
indicating whether any protest activity occured in m in 1953. Controls are popu-
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Table 1.8: Sticks: Stasi Presence in 1990
Indicator for
Public Stasi presence Secret Stasi presence Stasi Flats
(1) (2) (3)
Protest 1953 -0.005 0.082* 0.023
(0.034) (0.046) (0.020)
Controls 3 3 3
County FEs 3 3 3
Mean Dep. Variable 0.126 0.288 0.048
Observations 811 811 811
Adj. R2 0.524 0.455 0.472
Note Estimation results for equation (1.5) using only municipalities with 2,000 to 10,000 in-
habitants in 1950. The dependent variable in column 1 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if
there are any public, official Stasi establishments in 1990. In column 2 it is a dummy indicating
whether there were any disguised Stasi offices, and in column 3 a dummy indicating whether any
flats for Stasi personnel in 1990. Protest 1953 is a dummy that takes value 1 if there has been
any protest activity in 1953 in a municipality. Control variables in all regressions are popula-
tion in 1989, distance to any border of the GDR, a dummy for county capitals, distance to the
county capital, share of workers employed in industry in 1971 and share of workers employed
in state administration in 1971, in addition to county fixed effects according to 1989 county
borders. Standard errors clustered at the county level reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
lation in 1989, distance to any border of the GDR, a dummy for county capitals,
distance to the county capital, and shares of workers employed in industry as well
as state administration in 1971. αd are county fixed effects. Standard errors m are
clustered at the county level.
Results are presented in Table 1.8.37 I interpret the regression as a linear probabil-
ity model. The probability that any publicly visible Stasi (for example official office
buildings that were known to belong to the Stasi) object exist in a protest municipal-
ity in 1989 does not differ between protest and non-protest municipalities (column
1). The probability to have disguised objects, such as safe houses or flats used for
secret meetings, is around 8 percentage points (significant at 10 percent level) higher
in protest municipalities (column 2). This suggests that the GDR government not
only targeted opposition areas with military units that could potentially be used
violently against the population, but also increased their control of the population
37Table A.3 presents results if I extend the sample to include all municipalities that I can match.
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in other, less visible ways.
In column 3, I look at the number of flats for Stasi employees in a municipality.
This serves as a further robustness check whether the increase in construction in
protest municipalities happened to provide housing for state supporters, in this case
Stasi employees. The probability that Stasi housing existed is not higher in protest
municipalities in 1953.
1.3.6 Carrots and Sticks: Reactions in Housing to New
Military Troops
The GDR targeted opposition municipalities with both carrots and sticks. In this
section, I explore the relationship between construction and military presence by
looking at the reaction of carrots to an increase in sticks. Troops decrease the
probability of successful protests in municipalities, but at the same time they are
very likely to decrease the popularity of the government. If the government used
housing to alleviate the negative effect of stationing troops, construction would
increase once new troops enter a municipality.
To examine whether introducing sticks in an area leads to an increase in carrots, I
estimate the following regression
Constructionmt = βNewMilitaryUnitsmt + γNewMilitaryUnitsmt × Protestm
+ δControlsmt + αm + αt + mt (1.6)
where Constructionmt is the number of flats per 1,000 inhabitants in municipalitym
and year t, NewMilitaryUnits is a dummy measuring whether additional military
units are assigned to an area, Protest is a dummy that indicates protest activity in
1953 and αm and αt are municipality and time fixed effects, respectively. In some
additional regressions, I include whether there have been any additional military
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units in the 5 years prior or after year t. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.
Results are presented in Table 1.9.38 Column 1 establishes that municipalities that
have any military units in a given year have higher levels of residential construction
(1.583 additional flats per year, significant at 1 percent level).39 This effect does not
differ between protest and non-protest municipalities. Next, I examine the spatial
pattern of this. Construction increases by 3.364 (significant at 10 percent level) if
new military units join the municipality in that year, and by about 1.512 (signifi-
cant at 5 percent level) additional flats per 1,000 inhabitants when any additional
military units joined in the previous five years (column 2). This pattern does not
differ between protest and non-protest municipalities (column 3). There is also an
anticipation effect: if military units will be assigned in the next five years, construc-
tion already increases. This effect is smaller for protest municipalities (column 4).
Column 5 provides evidence that this increase in construction is not simply con-
struction of housing for military personnel. In the GDR, “normal” soldiers had to
live on base, only higher ranked soldiers were allowed to live in flats outside of base
(Kersten et al., 2011, p. 34). Thus, construction for soldiers would mostly consist
of military barracks. I only consider flats that have a kitchen here, because military
housing for troops would not have a kitchen in every flat. The coefficients remain
nearly unchanged compared to column 3, indicating that this result is not driven by
the construction of military barracks.
The existence of military troops will likely have impacted the popularity of the
regime in protest and non-protest municipalities. The results of this section suggest
that the government did in fact use carrots to alleviate the negative effect of sticks
on their popularity. In doing so, they did not differentiate between protest and
38Table A.3 in the appendix presents results when including municipalities with fewer than 2,000
or more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1950.
39The existence of military troops does not explain the entire difference in construction between
protest and non-protest municipalities. When comparing only municipalities that never had any
military troops, protest municipalities still see higher construction levels after 1953.
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Table 1.9: Reaction of Carrots to Sticks
Flats per 1,000 Inhabitants
All w/ kitchen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any military units 1.583***
(0.575)
Any military units 1.438
× Protest 1953 (1.172)
New military units in t 3.364* 3.361* 3.307* 3.365*
(1.799) (1.814) (1.771) (1.814)
New military units in t 0.008 -0.069 0.007
× Protest 1953 (0.634) (0.636) (0.634)
New military units 5 1.512** 1.557** 1.560**
years before (0.644) (0.637) (0.637)
New milit. units 5 years -0.150 -0.151
before × Protest 1953 (0.245) (0.245)
New military units 1.238*
5 years after (0.752)
New milit. units 5 years -0.764***
after × Protest 1953 (0.247)
Controls 3 3 3 3 3
Year FEs 3 3 3 3 3
Municipality FEs 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 41,932 41,932 41,932 41,932 41,932
Adj. R2 0.078 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Note Estimation results for equation (1.6) using only municipalities with 2,000 to 10,000 inhab-
itants in 1950. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is the number of newly constructed
flats per 1,000 inhabitants per municipality and year. In column (5), the dependent variable
is the number of newly constructed flats with a kitchen per 1,000 inhabitants per municipality
and year. All regressions control for a dummy for county capitals, distance to county capital,
and population. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance on
the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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non-protest municipalities.
1.4 Mechanisms: Carrots and Sticks or
Bureaucrat Quality?
One explanation for the observed increase in residential construction and the pres-
ence of military troops in protest areas is that the GDR regime targeted the opposi-
tion with carrots and sticks. But, the same empirical pattern could also be explained
by the behavior of local bureaucrats in areas with opposition (similar to the argu-
ment made in Lorentzen, 2013). It could either be the case that after 1953 there
were increased incentives for local bureaucrats to perform well in areas with more
protests. This would be the case if the government penalized bureaucrats that could
not stop the opposition after 1953. Career concerns could then have led to a buying
off of the opposition. Or it could be the case that places with more opposition had
higher quality bureaucrats after 1953. If opposition areas were assigned bureaucrats
of a higher quality, who were better able to deal with opposition and were more
effective at providing public goods and station military troops, construction and
military troops would increase in protest municipalities. To examine to what extent
these two channels can explain the empirical findings, I look at term duration and
quality measures of County Council Chairmen. I look at County Council Chair-
men, because County Councils decided on where within a county to build.40 These
Councils were headed by Chairmen, who held most decision power (Bittorf, 2014,
p. 102). To proxy the degree of opposition at the county level, I calculate the share
of municipalities within a county that had protests in 1953. Results are presented
in Table 1.10.
I first investigate the role of career concerns. There is archival evidence support-
ing the notion that the occurrence of protests could lead to a dismissal of local
40In addition, information on municipality level bureaucrats is not available.
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bureaucrats. The chairman of the county Löbau, for example, was replaced after
the Uprising of 1953, during which protests took place in his county. The following
extract can be found in his personal file
“Colleague Hutschenreither was withdrawn as Chairman of the County Council due
to his behavior in the days around the 17th of June 1953. Colleague H. was on a
holiday [...] from beginning of June until beginning of July. As the leading figure
of his county, he did not deem it necessary to obtain information about the situa-
tion in the county Löbau after the fascist provocation became known, not even via
telephone.”
If the government punished bureaucrats that could not prevent protests, we would
expect the probability of replacement after the Uprising of 1953 in counties with
more protest activity to be higher. First, I examine the “survival” of County Chair-
men who were in power during protests in 1953 as a function of the share of protests
municipalities within their county. The share of protest municipalities in 1953 is
not associated with a statistically significant difference in survival rates of County
Chairmen (column 1). Next, I estimate the probability that a Chairman is replaced
in a given year, controlling for counties and year fixed effects. The outcome vari-
able takes on the value 1 if the Chairman is replaced non-temporarily.41 While the
probability of replacement increased after 1953 in all counties, neither the share of
protest municipalities nor the interaction of this share with a post 1953 dummy is
significant (column 2). County Chairmen in counties with more protests were thus
over the entire period of analysis not more likely to be replaced than their coun-
terparts in counties with less protests. This would be very unlikely if the regime
punished local officials for protests.
Another alternative explanation of how local bureaucrats affected construction and
military presence is that more able bureaucrats were assigned to counties with more
41Temporary replacements took place if the Chairmen could not serve for a limited period of
time, for example due to medical issues or because he earned additional degrees.
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opposition. I proxy quality in different ways: first, I look at Chairmen who re-
ceived the Patriotic Order of Merit (Vaterländischer Verdienstorden) for their work
as Chairmen. This order was given to individuals and institutions in the GDR that
had distinguished themselves with their actions, which included local bureaucrats
that did exceptionally well in their position. Column 3 examines whether Chairmen
in counties with a higher share of protest municipalities were more likely to ever
receive an order of merit for their work as County Council. There is no statisti-
cally significant relationship between protests and orders of merit, suggesting that
Chairmen of Counties with many protests were not of a higher quality. It is also
not the case that people with better qualifications were chosen as Chairmen for the
more difficult counties: Chairmen in counties with higher share of protests were not
more likely to have had received an Order of Merit for their work as chairmen before
their appointment before or after 1953 (column 4). There is also no evidence that
they had more experience as chairmen by having been appointed in another counties
before they were assigned to counties with a larger share of protest municipalities
(column 5). We could also imagine that these Chairmen differed from each other in
how good their understanding of the local situation was. I proxy this by the distance
between place of birth to the county capital for those chairmen for which I could
find information on their birthplace. There is no statistically significant effect of the
share of protest municipalities on the distance in general or after 1953 (column 6).42
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 1.10 does not support the argument that
differences in construction were driven by differences in the quality of or incentives
for local bureaucrats.
42All results are robust to excluding all city counties, which are cities that form their own county
(see Table A.4 in the appendix).
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how an autocratic regime targets its opposition with carrots
and sticks using the example of the German Democratic Republic. In 1953, some
municipalities signaled their opposition to the regime by engaging in protests. As
a result, construction of flats per capita increased in these municipalities in com-
parison to municipalities without protests, and this increase is driven by state-led
construction. This difference cannot be explained by differences in the demand for
additional housing, the share of construction workers, or the share of industry work-
ers. At the same time, protest municipalities were more likely to receive military
units and hidden Stasi objects. Military units in the GDR were seen as measures
that can be directed against opposing citizens and municipalities had no economic
incentives to try to attract the National People’s Army. When we look at the timing
of construction and introducing military troops within municipalities, we see that
after municipalities receive military troops, construction increases. This indicates
that the GDR did take into account that increasing military presence has a negative
effect on the popularity of the regime, and tried to counteract this.
This paper help us to better understand the trade-offs of autocratic regimes when
using resource allocation and repression. I show that the government especially
targeted the living standards of those areas that opposed them to prevent further
protests, while at the same time building up a security apparatus that could have
prevented or crushed future protests. Even though this paper only empirically con-
siders one specific autocratic regime, other regimes that have a similarly hierarchical
organization and aim to be popular, as is for example the case for China, might be-
have comparably.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Flat Construction per Capita at the Municipality Level - Extended
Sample
Note: The figure shows average construction of flats per 1,000 inhabitants in protest and non-
protest municipalities for all municipalities in 1950. The vertical line indicates the year 1952. Data
sources: see text.
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Carrots: Difference-in-Differences Estimators, Extended Sample
Flats per 1000 Inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protest 1.190*** -0.235* -1.879 -0.235**
1953 (0.120) (0.128) (2.362) (0.091)
Post 1952 1.741*** 56.113*** 1.414*** 1.741*** 1.741***
(0.180) (3.340) (0.129) (0.182) (0.182)
Protest ‘53 2.115*** 2.036*** 16.287*** 2.036*** 2.013*** 0.892***
× Post ‘52 (0.022) (0.033) (0.740) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034)
Year FEs 3
Muni. FEs 3 3
Observations 220,264 220,264 10,012 10,012 220,264 220,264
Adj. R2 0.003 0.0040.330 0.020 0.044 0.054
Note Estimation results for equation (1.2) using all municipalities. The dependent variable is
the number of newly constructed flats per 1,000 inhabitants per year and municipality. Protest
1953 is an indicator variable whether any protest activity occured in the municipality in 1953.
Post 1952 is an indicator variable for all years after 1952. Columns (3) and (4) use the method-
ology suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) and aggregate all pre and post treatment observa-
tions for each municipality. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6). Robust standard errors in
columns (3) and (4). *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1
percent level, respectively.
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Table A.2: Sticks: Military Units, Extended Sample
Number of Military Units
before 1953 1949 – 1989 1949 – 1989 only after 1961
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protest 1953 0.019* -0.073** 0.015
(0.011) (0.034) (0.013)
Protest 1953 0.190*** 0.225***
× Post 1952 (0.048) (0.052)
Number Protests -0.000 0.006 -0.000
< 10km (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Number Protests < -0.008 -0.009*
10km × Post 1952 (0.005) (0.005)
Number NPA -0.024*** -0.004 0.017** -0.007
< 10km (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 17,936 184,031 192,044 123,032
Adj. R2 0.188 0.440 0.809 0.058
Note Estimation results for equation (1.4) using all municipalities. The dependent variables are
the number of military units per municipality and year that were established in the years indi-
cated in the column title. Column (1) restricts attention to military establishments until 1952.
Columns (2) and (3) incorporate all years from 1949 to 1989. Column (4) looks at the number
of military units after 1961 that were established in municipalities that did not have any mili-
tary presence prior to 1961. Controls in column 1, 2 and 4 are log of population 1950, the share
of workers in industry in 1946, distance to any Western border, a dummy for border municipal-
ities, a dummy for Nazi military presence, distance to the next municipality with Nazi military
and a dummy for county capitals, whether there is Soviet military in a municipality, distance
to the next municipality with Soviet military, share votes for the SED in 1946, and share votes
for the SED interacted with post 1952 (column 2 and 3). In column 3 and 4 I control for popu-
lation and the number of military units within a 10km radius. Column 1, 2 and 5 have county
fixed effects, column 3 and 4 municipality fixed effects. All regressions control for year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table A.3: Sticks: Stasi Presence in 1990, Extended Sample
Indicator for
Public Stasi presence Secret Stasi presence Stasi Flats
(1) (2) (3)
Protest 1953 0.028 0.091*** 0.018
(0.017) (0.027) (0.012)
Observations 4,212 4,212 4,212
Adj. R2 0.376 0.276 0.170
Note Estimation results for equation (1.5) using all municipalities. The dependent variable in
column 1 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if there are any public, official Stasi establishments
in 1990. In column 2 it is a dummy indicating whether there were any disguised Stasi offices,
and in column 3 a dummy indicating whether any flats for Stasi personnel in 1990. Protest 1953
is a dummy that takes value 1 if there has been any protest activity in 1953 in a municipality.
Control variables in all regressions are population in 1989, distance to any border of the GDR,
a dummy for county capitals, distance to the county capital, share of workers employed in in-
dustry in 1971 and share of workers employed in state administration in 1971, in addition to
county fixed effects according to 1989 county borders. Standard errors clustered at the county
level reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent,
and 1 percent level, respectively.
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2 | The Rise of Fiscal Capacity
The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history.
Schumpeter (1918)
2.1 Introduction
The idea that “nothing is certain but death and taxes” would have surprised a person
living in the Middle Ages. While death was of course certain, taxes were either non-
existent or irregular. Today, on the other hand, taxation by sovereign states is
taken for granted in most parts of the world. However, there are large differences
in the ability of governments to levy and collect taxes as it for example becomes
apparent when looking at the size of the shadow economy relative to overall GDP
in different countries: in Switzerland the shadow economy is estimated to make up
7 percent of GDP, whereas in Georgia around 65 percent (Medina and Schneider,
2018). These differences have far-reaching consequences for the ability of states
to provide government spending, social services, or growth-enhancing investments.
It is thus not surprising that most accounts of the rise of the modern state, from
Schumpeter (1918) and Weber (1919) to Tilly (1975) and Olson (1993), identify the
emergence of taxation as the key hallmark and defining feature of the state.
Even though the introduction of permanent and stable fiscal administrations is one
This Chapter is joint work with Davide Cantoni and Matthias Weigand.
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of the most striking changes in the relationship between states and their citizens,
and there is no scarcity of theories explaining this crucial transition to modernity,
we often lack empirical evidence on the circumstances and consequences of the es-
tablishment of fiscal capacity. Historical data on tax revenues or tax-collecting
institutions are scarce, and in most cases do not extend back to the date of their in-
troduction. In fact, the very emergence of modern statistics is clearly a consequence,
not a precondition for the emergence of fiscal capacity (Woolf, 1989).1
In this paper, we use the rich history of the Holy Roman Empire to study a range
of economic and institutional developments arguably linked to the introduction of
modern fiscal administrations. Between the 16th and the 18th century, several com-
ponent territories of the Holy Roman Empire introduced permanent offices, staffed
by professionally trained individuals, in charge of raising and organizing revenues,
and replacing personalized, local, or ad-hoc systems of taxation. These offices,
mostly called “Chambers” (Hofkammer or Rentkammer), substantially increased
the ability of sovereigns to raise taxes and thus to increase military power or pro-
vide public goods.2 The outcomes we study concern both the periods before the
introduction of fiscal institutions – thus allowing us to test theories relating to the
emergence of fiscal capacity – and after their instruction – thus shedding light on
the economic consequences of this momentous transition.
Our contribution is fourfold. First, we study and date the process of fiscal central-
ization for 24 territories of the Holy Roman Empire in the period between the 16th
and the 18th century. The Holy Roman Empire, a loose confederation of hundreds
of largely sovereign states of varying size, in an ideal setting in which to study the
genesis and consequences of this institutional innovation. The rich available histori-
ography provides evidence on where, and under which circumstances, states invested
1An alternative approach to investigate the origins of state formation and taxation is to study
contemporary weakly institutionalized environments and their development in reaction to external
shocks, as in Sánchez de la Sierra (2019).
2For most if not all territories of that time, raising sovereign debt was not a feasible path to
increase state revenue, due to unsurmountable commitment problems (North and Weingast, 1989;
Drelichman and Voth, 2014). Arguably, access to credit was easier for city states (Stasavage, 2011).
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in their fiscal capacity. The detailed nature of our historical data allow us to ob-
serve all major territories – kingdoms, prince-bishoprics, dukedoms, margraviates,
and principalities of all kinds – on a yearly level. We can thereby overcome selection
(suvivorship) bias. In contrast to existing literature that focuses on few, ex-post
successful territories such as Prussia or England, we consider all territories that ex-
isted and not just those that survived and eventually became large.3 To understand
the mechanisms that explain fiscal capacity and its effects, we need to understand
which territories do not survive, and why.
Second, we map the cities in our dataset to a rich set of state formation and growth-
related outcomes for the Holy Roman Empire. Our data are based on the rich
city histories contained in the Deutsches Städtebuch (Keyser et al., 1939-2003), a
detailed encyclopedia of all 2,394 places within Germany according to its borders
in 1937 that were granted, at some point, city rights.4 In particular, we can first
measure a variety of outcomes related to historical territories, as our unit of ob-
servation: we observe dynastic mergers, break-ups, territorial expansions or losses
as a consequence of wars or treaties. More generally, we can trace the existence,
size, and shape of a territory through the number of cities a territory controls. Our
second set of outcomes are all major construction events listed, for any given city
in the Deutsches Städtebuch: these can be classified into different types of build-
ings (military, administrative, public infrastructures. . . ) and are dated precisely at
the city-year level.5 Construction data give us an insight into administrative and
military investments, and are ultimately a proxy for economic (urban) growth. We
3Tilly (1975) points out this fundamental selection problem: “Most of the European efforts
to build states failed. The enormous majority of the political units which were around to bid for
autonomy and strength in 1500 disappeared in the next few centuries, smashed or absorbed by other
states-in-the-making [. . . ] [O]f the handful which survived or emerged into the nineteenth century
as autonomous states, only a few operated effectively–regardless of what criterion of effectiveness we
employ. The disproportionate distribution of success and failure puts us in the unpleasant situation
of dealing with an experience in which most of the cases are negative, while only the positive cases
are well-documented” (p. 38-39).
4We use the anachronism “Germany” throughout the paper to refer to the German-speaking
lands of the Holy Roman Empire. The cities included in the Deutsches Städtebuch encompass
Germany in the borders of 1937.
5These data have been used previously in Cantoni et al. (2018).
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can also measure a territory’s exposure to war through the prism of the recorded
history – occupations, sieges, destruction – of the cities that belong to it, again as
reported in the Deutsches Städtebuch.
Third, we investigate the circumstances under which territories have adopted the
institutions of fiscal centralization. We are able to confirm a number of hypotheses
that have been put forward in the theoretical literature on the origins of fiscal
capacity: territories are more likely to centralize when neighboring territories are
centralized, and when they are exposed to a more bellicose environment.
Fourth, we look at the consequences of fiscal centralization. Observing territory-
related outcomes, we find that centralized territories are more likely to survive, and
grow more (expand the number of cities that they control) than non-centralized
territories. Observing city-related outcomes, we find that cities belonging to cen-
tralized territories invest more in administrative and military construction. This
is predicted by models of fiscal centralization. But we also find evidence that is
contrary to one of the core assumptions in the formal literature on fiscal capacity.
In theoretical frameworks citizens accept fiscal institutions and taxes because they
expect revenues to be used for military investments, which will protect them. These
investments are always modeled in the form of non-excludable public goods. De-
spite this, we find that increases in military investments only occur in the core of
territories, and not in the periphery. Factually, some citizens were thus excluded
from these investments, and they can thus not be thought of as public goods.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we survey the existing
literature on fiscal capacity, and derive testable hypotheses that we will empirically
test. Section 2.3 discusses the historical background of fiscal capacity in the Holy
Roman Empire, and section 2.4 explains our dataset. We first look at potential
determinants of fiscal capacity in section 2.5, before turning to the effects of fiscal
capacity in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Literature and Hypotheses
There is a rich literature in the field of history trying to explain how taxation
by a sovereign state went from a contested concept to an accepted fact of life in
Europe. In this section, we discuss this literature, and derive hypotheses that we
will empirically test.
2.2.1 Definitions
At the center of the literature discussed here are the concepts of state capacity
and fiscal capacity. State capacity can broadly be defined as a “state’s ability to
implement a range of policies” (Besley and Persson, 2010, p.1), or “the ability of a
state to collect taxes, enforce law and order, and provide public goods” (Johnson
and Koyama, 2017, p. 2). Often, states are described according to their ability to
enforce policies as either “weak” or “strong”. In some cases the term state capacity
does not refer to this broad definition, but to a concept mostly termed fiscal capacity
in the economics literature.6 Fiscal capacity “captures how much tax a government
could potentially raise given the structure of the tax system and its available power
of enforcement” (Besley and Persson, 2013, p. 52). Sufficient levels of fiscal capacity
allow states to collect enough taxes to finance their policies (Johnson and Koyama,
2017, p. 2). Empirical work has used several observable measures or proxies for
fiscal capacity. Dincecco (2009, p. 52) uses a binary variable measuring whether a
country is fiscally centralized, where fiscal centralization “was completed the year
that the national government began to secure revenues using a tax system with
uniform tax rates throughout the country”. Besley and Persson (2011) turn to per
capita tax returns as a measure of the degree of fiscal capacity.
6The usage of the term state capacity to refer to what is mostly termed fiscal capacity in the
economics literature is in line with how Tilly (1975) originally used the term. In this Chapter state
capacity refers to the broad definition listed above, and we use the term fiscal capacity to talk
about the capacity to tax in particular.
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The literature on fiscal and state capacity is linked to the large literature on the
importance of institutions for economic growth. Much influential work has defined
institutions along the lines of what can be called “legal capacity”. Legal capacity
is the ability to support markets (Besley and Persson, 2010, p.1) and the ability to
enforce rules across the entirety of the territory a government claims to rule (Johnson
and Koyama, 2017, p. 2). North (1981), for example, measures the strength of states
in early modern Europe by their ability to enforce property rights. Acemoglu et al.
(2001) look at the risk of expropriation and repudiation of government contracts.
Some work on fiscal capacity also studies interactions with legal capacity (e.g. in
Besley and Persson, 2009).
2.2.2 Determinants of Fiscal Capacity
Attempts to explain the emergence of state capacity as a driver of state formation
go back at least as far as Weber (1919). Weber defined the state in terms of its
monopoly on legitimate violence over a defined geographical area. Many authors
have tried to explain how states managed to establish this monopoly (see for example
Brewer, 1990; Levi, 1989). One of the most influential arguments on state formation
was made by Charles Tilly (1975), and can be summarized as “[w]ar made the state
and the state made war” (Tilly, 1975, p. 42). Fighting war was costly, and thus rulers
had to extract money from their population to finance these wars. As losing war
was costly to everyone (e.g. if cities were looted), the population supported higher
military investments and was willing to contribute to finance these. To organize the
collection of taxes, fiscal bureaucracies were established. Once some states had built
up such institutions, their neighboring states had to build up these fiscal capacity
themselves to be able to compete with them or they would vanish (see for example
Tilly, 1975; Bean, 1973).7
7For a more detailed summary of the argument that war led to fiscal capacity and this led to
state foundation in Europe refer to Herbst (1990, p. 117-122).
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This leads to our first hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Fiscal Centralization of neighboring territories increases the prob-
ability that a territory will fiscally centralize
Tilly’s argument that war drives fiscal centralization is at the core of many the-
oretical models on fiscal and state capacity in the economics literature.8 Military
spending as a reaction to a threat of war enters models as a public good. While
economists argue that there could also be other public goods that drive the build-up
of fiscal capacity, they usually discuss military investments as the only example of
a common-interest public good (see for example Besley and Persson, 2009). Besley
et al. (2013) extend these considerations to a dynamic framework looking at the evo-
lution of fiscal capacity over time, again focussing on the demand for public goods,
i.e. military investments, as a potential driver of fiscal centralization.9 A higher
demand for the public good translates into more investments into fiscal capacity.
The link between war and fiscal centralization has been refined in several ways. Some
authors distinguish between external and internal wars (Besley and Persson, 2008,
2010). While the threat of external war generates a common demand for military
investments across the entire population, threat of internal war generates conflicting
interests among the population. These models predict that as a result, the threat
of external war leads to higher levels and threat of civil war leads to lower levels
of fiscal capacity. Ko et al. (2018) examine how the number and geographic origins
of external threats affect state-building. In their model military strength decreases
with distance to the capital city. They argue that, as European territories faced
external threats from different directions, it was optimal to have several (smaller)
8Other potential determinants of fiscal capacity that are discussed in the literature are political
stability, protection of minorities, dependence on natural resources as well as the distribution of
economic and political power (Besley and Persson, 2009). Other authors have argued that distance
mattered for building up institutions, and that thus smaller polities had an advantage when travel
was still slow and costly (Stasavage, 2010).
9They also regard cohesiveness of institutions and stability of institutions as additional drivers.
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states instead of a centralized European empire. This allowed each state to tax its
population and use tax incomes to provide military investments in a capital that was
as close as possible to the external threat it was facing. Queralt (2018) distinguishes
how war was financed in the modern period (from 1817 to 1913): while tax-financed
wars have a positive impact on fiscal capacity, loan-financed wars do not always
lead to an increase in fiscal capacity. Karaman and Pamuk (2013) look at twelve
European territories from the 16th to the 18th century to test the role of warfare,
economic structure, and political regime for the development of fiscal and state
capacity. They find that war and modern urbanized economic structures increase
tax revenues. Political regimes interact with these factors as representative regimes
were more successful at building state capacity in urbanized economies, whereas
authoritarian regimes fared better in less urbanized settings.
Gennaioli and Voth (2015) examine the changing role of money for military success
over time. Available financial resources only begin to matter for war success after the
so-called Military Revolution (after Roberts, 1956), which introduced new (costly)
military technologies.10 The authors derive a model in which threat of war only leads
to increases in state capacity when financial resources matter for the probability of
winning war.11
10While some key innovations such as gunpowder and the star-shaped fortification spread earlier
(in the 14th and 15th centuries, respectively), Gennaioli and Voth (2015) determine the year 1650
as the turning point after which differences in military expenditures start becoming crucial in
determining the outcomes of a battle.
11Another result of the model in the paper is that only cohesive countries will invest in state
capacity, as building up state capacity is costly for divided countries. Thus cohesive countries
survive, while divided countries disappear.
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In our second hypothesis, we test the general argument on war and fiscal capacity,
and the refined argument made by Gennaioli and Voth (2015)
Hypothesis 2a: Threat of war increases the probability that a territory will fis-
cally centralize
Hypothesis 2b: Threat of war only increases the probability that a territory will
fiscally centralize after the Military Revolution (i.e. after 1650)
2.2.3 Effects of Fiscal Capacity
In the models discussed here, more investments into fiscal capacacity generate higher
levels of fiscal capacity. These investments translate into higher revenues for the
state, which are used to finance war, or – more generally – to finance investments
into public goods (for example in Besley and Persson, 2009). In addition, states
that are able to extract some part of their citizens’ incomes have incentives to foster
economic growth by investing into growth enhancing policies (in the spirit of Ol-
son’s (1993) stationary bandit). This mechanism is captured both in the theoretical
(Besley and Persson, 2008) and in the empirical (Dincecco, 2015; Dincecco and Katz,
2016; Dincecco and Prado, 2012) literature on fiscal capacity. To study the effect
of fiscal capacity on economic growth empirically, these papers use the incidence of
war or war casualties in the past as an instrument for fiscal capacity. Conflict in the
past is associated with higher economic growth/more wealth today. This motivates
our third set of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 3a: Fiscally centralized territories invest more in military and ad-
ministration
Hypothesis 3b: Fiscally centralized territories have higher economic growth
In theoretical frameworks higher spending on war increases the probability of win-
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ning war, which means that rulers are able to remain in power (Besley and Persson,
2010); winning wars is thus predicted to be associated with the survival of territo-
ries in our setting. Gennaioli and Voth (2015) predict that fiscal capacity leads to a
higher probability to win wars after the Military Revolution. They show empirically
that large European states with more tax revenues were more likely to win wars
after the Military Revolution. To circumvent the problem that war is endogenous,
they instrument the threat of war for countries by wars in neighboring countries.
In Alesina and Spolaore (2005), there is a positive relationship between wars and
the size of states, because a more bellicose environment is associated with higher
incentives to form larger states. We will study the following hypotheses
Hypothesis 4a: Fiscally centralized states are less likely to vanish
Hypothesis 4b: Fiscally centralized states grow more in size
Hypothesis 4c: Fiscally centralized states are less likely to vanish and grow more,
because they are more successful at war
Other effects of war that are discussed in the literature include the build-up of
national identity (Alesina et al., 2017; Mazumder, 2018), urbanization (Dincecco
and Onorato, 2016), or the welfare state in general (Dincecco, 2015).
2.2.4 Beyond Explaining European History
The argument that historic warfare led to investments in state capacity has also been
studied outside the context of nation building in Europe. Herbst (1990, 2014) aims
to explain why African states are so weak by comparing the history of European state
formation to (the absence) of African state formation before colonialism. In Europe,
high population densities and scarce land meant that rulers competed over land, and
thus had to finance conflicts over territories. In Africa, on the other hand, land was
abundant and people scarce. The absence of external threats implied that there
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were no incentives for rulers to build up fiscal capacity to finance wars. According
to Herbst, these historical developments explain weak state power of African states
today. Depetris-Chauvin (2016) also suggests that there is a link between historical
experiences and current state effectiveness in Africa, as he argues that regions in
Africa with a longer history of statehood are better able to preserve order and
experience less conflict today. Dincecco et al. (2018) study the link between conflict
and fiscal capacity in the African context and find that conflict in Africa is associated
with higher fiscal capacity, but at the same time more civil war. They suggest that
a lack of social trust might explain why more historical warfare is not associated
with more favorable current outcomes in Africa in contrast to the European case.
Ko et al. (2018) explain the political centralization of China as a reaction to having
an external threat only from one direction. In this case, having a government with
a large tax base that can provide military investments at the affected border is the
rational strategy. The authors present some evidence that during times in which
there was a larger external threat, China was more likely to be politically unified.
State capacity and fiscal capacity are also studied outside of the literature explaining
the rise of effective states. State and in particular fiscal capacity are key concepts
in development economics as states with low state and fiscal capacity lack economic
growth. Missing fiscal capacity is said to prohibit developing nations to raise rev-
enues that they could use to govern effectively (Migdal, 1988), and missing tax
revenues in turn explain low overall economic development (Bird et al., 2008).
2.3 Historical Background
In this paper, we study the rise of fiscal capacity in the Holy Roman Empire. The
Holy Roman Empire (HRE) was an assembly of many different territories and existed
from the 9th until the 19th century in Central Europe. It was headed by an elected
Emperor. This Emperor was never able to fully unite the different territories and
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to create a centralized government, instead territories were ruled by local princes,
who decided on the administrative and fiscal organization of their lands.
In the beginning of the Middle Ages, there was only very little fiscal capacity in
the territories of the HRE. Local offices (so-called Ämter) were in charge of revenue
collection and spending of princes. Revenues did not stem from taxes yet, instead
they came from sources that were accessible even without sophisticated levels of
fiscal capacity: from estates, demesnes and forests, income from court fees, as well
as mine, salt and coin monopolies, and tariffs. The introduction of taxes began
in the 13th century (Klein, 1974, p. 12-14). Initially, dues and taxes were mostly
paid in-kind, because the medieval economy was not monetarized yet. If the prince,
who at this point did not have a steady court location, came to a region, in-kind
payments were used to provide for the prince and his court. This local collection
of non-monetary revenues continued until approximately the middle of the 15th
century. After that central cash offices (Kassen) were introduced.
Over time, princes needed more revenues, for example to finance an increasing num-
ber of feuds between territories or to pay for the increasing costs of holding court.
Naturally, this raised their incentives to introduce some form of fiscal administra-
tion. As a first step in many territories, fiscal matters were assigned to one person,
the so-called Landrentmeister.12 The Landrentmeister was in charge of collecting
and organizing revenues, but there was no formal institution which he presided
over. Initially, most of these Landrentmeister were of noble origin, however, over
time there was a shift towards commoners with a professional and university-trained
background. In larger territories he was supported by one or two writers. One of
the first jobs of this basic, un-institutionalized financial administration was the in-
spection and auditing of local offices.
The continuing centralization of territories’ administrations in the 15th and 16th
12In the lower Rhine areas the Landrentmeister existed already in the 14th century, but in general
this position only arose from the mid-15th century onward.
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century also affected the organization of fiscal administrations. During this time,
Court Councils (Hofräte), that is informal groups of confidants, who helped rulers
to make decisions, first emerged. Initially, these councils were concerned with all
administrative areas, but quickly certain fields were handed to newly established,
specialized councils. This was the beginning of the establishment of the first Finance
Councils, mostly called Chambers (Hofkammern or Rentkammern) (Klein, 1974, p.
16), which marked the introduction of centralized fiscal institutions, that continued
to evolve over the next centuries. The Chamber was in charge of all domains and
their revenues, as well as revenues from dues, tariffs, and taxes, and used these rev-
enues to make payments in the name of the prince. Eventually, the Chamber took
on the role of an economic institution which tried to secure old and promote new
revenue sources. This institutional and geographical centralization of fiscal admin-
istration was only possible because taxes were now paid in cash and princes had
a constant residence. In general, smaller territories had smaller chambers (Wake-
field, 2009, p. 16-17); larger territories had several Financial Councilors, smaller
territories often just had one.
The exact form and time of introduction of Chambers varied across territories. The
first territory in our dataset to centralize was Württemberg in 1521 while it was
controlled by Habsburg. The concept of centralizing the fiscal administration in a
Chamber was already introduced in some areas of the Habsburg Empire at that
time. After occupation ended, Württemberg continued to have an independent
Chamber, which was the central cash office, and in charge of the prince’s domains
and local offices. In Bavaria, a Chamber was introduced in 1550. Before this, an
assigned official administered all revenues. There was no special office in charge of
finances yet. After 1550 all spending and all financial matters had to go through
the Chamber. In Hesse, the financial administration was also already executed by
assigned officials before the introduction of a Chamber. Some of these officials were
also responsible for other matters. The actual establishment of a Chamber was in
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1558, when the first Chamber order (Kammerordnung) was adopted. It specified
that the Chamber was in charge of managing the treasure, debts, spending of the
court on wages and food, as well as all princely properties including the forests. In
1567, Hesse split up into two lineages, Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Darmstadt. Hesse-
Kassel continued the Chamber, whereas in Hesse-Darmstadt there is only evidence
for a Chamber from the 1590s onwards.
Until the first half of the 18th century, a collegial organization of Chambers became
the norm, even though the exact organizational set-up differed across territories.
Different departments run by different Councilors within the Chamber were estab-
lished. The first areas where this happened were trade and crafts. The aim was
to establish departments in charge of individual aspects of governing. Habsburg
and Prussia faced even more challenges here, because they also had to combine
the (fiscal) administration of their different territories while establishing territorial
unity. Over time, these newly established departments suppressed the formerly
all-encompassing role of the Chambers (compare to Willoweit, 1982, p. 330-347).
The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 also marks a turning point
in the fiscal history of German territories. The number of territories fell rapidly
and in 1815 39 German states formed the German Confederation. Each territory
established its own finance ministry, which organized the relevant subordinated
departments. There were still large differences in the fiscal capacity of different
states. For example, the introduction of the universal income tax, a hallmark of
sophisticated levels of fiscal capacity, ranged between 1834 in Hanover and 1913 in
Mecklenburg-Neustrelitz and Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The Principality of Waldeck
never introduced a universal income tax until it ceased to exist in 1918.
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Figure 2.1: Cities in our Dataset within 1937 Borders
Note Each dot represents the location of one city in our dataset within the borders of Germany
of 1937. Data sources: see text
2.4 Data
Our analysis is based on a novel panel of 2,394 cities and their corresponding 707
territories from 1400 to 1800.13 Cities are taken from the Deutsches Städtebuch
(Keyser et al., 1939-2003), an encyclopedic book containing all cities that existed
in Germany in 1937. The location of these cities is mapped in Figure 2.1. We
complement this with information on the history of administrative entities based on
an encyclopedia on German territories (Köbler, 2007), a website listing the majority
of German and European noble families, a large number of historical maps, and
13We exclude the territory Bohemia from our analysis. There are two reasons why we do so: first,
due to the location of the Bohemian lands, our dataset only captures a fraction of the kingdom,
which extended far into the east. Thus, we cannot clearly infer about its size and the changes
thereof. Second, its ruling family, the Habsburg Dynasty, aggravates the issue further, as their
lands in Austria, Hungary, and Spain are also not covered in the data. No other territorial entity
or ruling family is so clearly peripheral in our data. We note that no results change fundamentally
with Bohemia included into the analysis (results available on request).
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sources on individual families and territories.14
Figure 2.2: Territories in the Holy Roman Empire
Note The figure shows territorial borders for the years 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, and 1800 within
German borders of 1937. To map territories, we first calculate a Thiessen polygon around each
city, taking into account terrain ruggedness. Next, we aggregate all cities and “their” surrounding
Thiessen polygons that belong to the same territory in a given year. Data sources: see text
Each city is assigned to a territory in each year. The exact borders of territories in
the Holy Roman Empire are mostly unclear. To obtain an idea of the geographical
14For more information on the coding of the territories refer to Appendix B.1.
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extent of territories, we thus estimate each territory’s likely area of influence. We
proxy borders by drawing polygons around each city, and assigning each point in
the Holy Roman Empire to its closest city, taking into account territory ruggedness.
The assignment is decided upon by modified Thiessen polygons (Voronoi partitions).
Figure 2.2 shows a snapshot of the size and location of territories created in this
way for each century from 1400 to 1800. The number of territories in our dataset
declines from 367 to 196 between 1400 and 1800. At the same time the surviving
territories grew in size; while the average territory that we observe in 1400 had 85
cities, it had 245 in 1800 (the overall number of cities that we observe in each year is
constant).15 The Herfindahl index, which measures the concentration of cities across
territories, increased by a factor of 3 between 1400 and 1800 (see Figure B.1 in the
appendix). In other words, half of the territories were unsuccessful and disappeared,
while the successfully remaining territories tripled their number of cities. By 1800
small territories still existed, albeit in much lower numbers than 400 years earlier.
For each city, the Städtebuch contains information on significant construction events
at the city level. We group construction events into different categories: administra-
tive (courthouses, town halls, ...), military (castles, arsenals, fortifications, ...), and
economic construction (storages, factories, manufacturies, ...). There are around
16,000 construction events for which we know the year of construction. We supple-
ment this by data on modern, star-shaped fortifications based on Schütte (1984),
Klöffer (2004), as well as Wikipedia, and google maps statellite images. These forti-
fications developed during the Military Revolution and are one example of a costly
military technology that territories can adopt.
The Städtebuch also contains attacks at the city level. Unfortunately, it is not known
from which territories these attacks originated. It could very well be the case, that
attacks on cities are part of a broader set of war activities, in which the territory
under consideration is attacked and at the same time also attacks other territories.
15Median territory size increased from 32 to 90 in the same time span.
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Figure 2.4: Centralized Territories in the Holy Roman Empire
Note The black area represents the area covered by centralized territories in the years 1500, 1600,
1700, and 1800. Data sources: see text
If this is the case, attacks can be used as a proxy for war. In Table B.2 in the
Appendix we provide evidence that attacks on cities of territories occur at the same
time as new cities enter these territories. We thus interpret attacks as a proxy for
overall military conflict in the remainder of the paper.
To measure fiscal centralization, we collected a novel dataset on the timing of fiscal
centralization in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. The dataset builds on
a comprehensive handbook on the history of administration in Germany (Jeserich
et al., 1983). We supplemented this with information from a large number of publi-
cations on fiscal and regional histories. We find evidence for fiscal centralization in
24 territories, which are presented in Figure 2.3.16 There is considerable variation
in the timing of fiscal centralization: Württemberg and Albertine Saxony were the
16Appendix B.1 summarizes the dates of fiscal centralization and type of institution that was
introduced for each territory, and lists selected sources.
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first territories to centralize at the beginning of the 16th century, whereas the Duchy
of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Prince-Bishopric of Augsburg, the Electorate of Trier, and
the Prince-Bishopric of Paderborn only centralize at the beginning of the 18th cen-
tury. The number of cities within centralized territories increases as the number of
centralized territories increases. When Württemberg centralized in 1521, 81 cities
belonged to a centralized territory, by 1600 261 cities, and in 1723, when the last
territory in our dataset, the Prince-Bishopric of Paderborn, introduced a Chamber,
there were 1,526 cities in centralized territories. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the area
covered by centralized territories increases between 1500 and 1800. In 1500 there
were no centralized territories yet, but by 1600 already large parts of the area of
Germany in 1937 belonged to centralized territories. By 1700 and 1800 this area
had increased even further, incorporating even more space especially in the Northern
parts.17
2.5 Determinants of Fiscal Centralization
According to the literature on fiscal capacity, fiscal centralization is driven by cen-
tralization of other territories (hypothesis 1) and an environment of bellicosity (hy-
potheses 2a and 2b). Centralized neighbors and threat of war increase the need
of territories for revenues to finance potential conflict. To meet these demands,
17In our main analysis we assume that territories for which we have not found any evidence for
the existence of a chamber, were not centralized. It is possible that by doing so we are treating some
territories which in fact were centralized as non-centralized. If this wrong assignment is random,
our estimates would be smaller than the real difference between centralized and non-centralized
territories. It would be more difficult to find statistically significant differences between the two
groups. However, it could also be the case that we were more likely to find evidence on centralization
for larger territories. In this case our empirical analysis would lead to larger estimates than the
real difference that is due to centralization. There are several reasons why we believe that this
is not the case here. First, the historical literature clearly states that centralization in the HRE
started in Württemberg in 1521. Thus, it is very unlikely that we missed anything before 1521.
Second, not all of our treated territories are big (for example Munster or Trier). Third, we have
found evidence for some territories that have not been treated – and these are in fact territories
that ceased to exist. And last, there is a large regional history on German territories, which also
focuses on small territories. In addition, we address many of these issues in our empirical analysis
by controlling for territory fixed effects and thus only looking at the variation of outcomes within
a territory after centralization was introduced.
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territories centralize. To explore this we estimate the following model
100× Centralizationjt = γ1CentralizedNeighborsjt
+ γ2CentralizedNeighborsjt × Post1650t
+ β1ThreatWarjt + β2ThreatWarjt × Post1650t
+ ζ1Controlsjt−1 + ζ1Controlsjt−1 × Post1650t
+ αt + it (2.1)
where Centralizationjt is a dummy that takes value 1 if territory j centralizes
in year t, and zero otherwise. For readability we multiply this dummy with 100.
Once a territory centralizes, it does not lose this status. Since we are interested in
territories centralizing instead of staying centralized, we drop territories from the
sample after they centralize. CentralizedNeighborsjt is the natural logarithm of
one plus the number of cities from centralized territories within a 50 km radius of
j in t. Positive values of γ1 indicate that centralization of neighbors is related to
the centralization of a territory, as claimed in hypothesis 1. To capture the threat
of war, ThreatWar is measured in two ways: first, we use a dummy measuring
whether any cities in territory j were attacked in the current period or one or two
decades before, which proxies actual war activities. Second, we also turn to the
stock of military construction by other territories within a 50 km radius of territory
j as a measure for the risk of a potential war, capturing how militarily exposed j
is. The coefficient β1 tests hypothesis 2a, whether threat of war is associated with
an increased probability to centralize. CentralizedNeighbors and ThreatWar are
both interacted with Post1650, a dummy for all decades after 1650. We follow
Gennaioli and Voth (2015) who also use a post 1650 dummy to capture the onset
of the Military Revolution, after which financial resources arguably became more
important to win wars. If hypothesis 2b is true, and threat of war after the Military
Revolution increases the probability that a territory centralizes, β2 will be larger
than zero. γ2 indicates whether centralization of neighbors is associated with a
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different probability of centralization of a territory after the Military Revolution.
Controlsjt−1 comprise, at the current state, only the lagged natural logarithm of
the number of cities in territory j. We also interact this with Post1650 to allow
the number of cities to have a different effect before and after the onset of the
Military Revolution. αt are decade fixed effects. By including time fixed effects
we are controlling for any time specific factors that are constant over time. This
is important in our setting if these factors are correlated with threat of war or
centralization of neighbors and have an effect on centralization themselves. Standard
errors are clustered at the territory level.
We use a linear probability model here to calculate the probability of centralization,
following the approach in Drago et al. (2016). Using a linear probability model in
this setting, as opposed to a probit, logit or Cox duration model, allows us to include
a wider range of fix effects.
2.5.1 Results
Results of Regression 2.1 are presented in Table 2.1. Before the onset of the Military
Revolution, each additional city from a centralized territory within a 50 km radius
is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in the probability of centralizing. After
the Military Revolution, there is no longer a statistically significant difference in
the probability of centralizing between territories with and without a centralized
neighbor. This supports Hypothesis 1 with limitations; having a centralized neighbor
increases the probability of centralization, but only before 1650; after the Military
Revolution, having a centralized neighbor no longer predicts centralization.
There are two potential explanations for this pattern. It could be that territories
with a centralized neighbor are more likely to disappear, that is, they are more likely
to be conquered by their centralized neighboring territory. In this case, they cease
to exist before they have a chance to centralize. We examine the relationship be-
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Table 2.1: Predicting Centralization
Centralized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Centralized Neighbors 1.378*** 1.320*** 1.170***
(0.398) (0.393) (0.380)
ln Centralized Neighbors -1.755** -1.778** -1.817**
× Post1650 (0.727) (0.731) (0.790)
Attack current decade 3.357*** 3.254***
(1.085) (1.066)
Attack, one decade before 2.166** 2.113**
(0.868) (0.854)
Attack, two decades before 1.499** 1.402*
(0.762) (0.748)
Attack current decade -0.431 -0.310
× Post1650 (2.243) (2.244)
Attack, one decade before 1.235 1.301
× Post1650 (1.951) (1.946)
Attack, two decades before 2.805 2.914
× Post1650 (2.130) (2.132)
ln Military Neighbors 1.510*** 0.843*
(0.518) (0.468)
ln Military Neighbors -1.126 -0.0503
× Post1650 (1.238) (1.371)
Controls 3 3 3 3 3
R-squared 0.386 0.403 0.384 0.405 0.386
Observations 108,819 96,845 109,083 96,607 108,819
Note Table shows results of Regression 2.1. Controls are the natural logarithm of the number
cities and the natural logarithm of the number of cities times a dummy for post 1650. Standard
errors are clustered at territory level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
tween centralized neighbors and survival rates in the next section. Another possible
explanation is that centralized territories no longer focus on solely conquering their
neighbors after the Military Revolution, but use novel military technologies to con-
quer territories in all parts of the HRE. In this case the overall number of centralized
territories instead of distance to a centralized territory matters for centralization.
The overall number of territories is the same for all territories and is thus captured
by year fixed effects.
Attacks in the current decade, as well as one and two decades ago are positively
79
Fiscal Capacity
related to centralization of a territory. This effect does not change with the onset of
the Military Revolution (columns 2 and 4). Looking at the mere risk of war the same
pattern emerges: an additional military building of another territory that lies within
a 50 km radius increases the probability of centralization by 0.8 to 1.5 percent both
before and after the Military Revolution (columns 3 and 5). This suggests that the
so-called threat of war, which forms the basis of many models, can be understood
both as the threat of an existing war or the threat of war occurring. With regard to
our hypotheses the results suggest that conflict is related to centralization (in line
with Hypothesis 2a), but this effect does only arise with the advent of the Military
Revolution (contrasting Hypothesis 2b).
2.6 Effects of Fiscal Centralization
In this section, we first investigate investment activity of centralized compared to
non-centralized territories at the local level, then their performance in war, and their
survival probabilities. Last, we consider the size of centralized versus non-centralized
territories.
2.6.1 Local Investments
In Hypothesis 3, we postulate that fiscally centralized territories invest more in ad-
ministration and the military, and have higher rates of economic growth. To test
this, we analyze investment activities at the city level and proxy investment activity
by physical construction. In particular, we examine whether overall construction
activity increases, and whether there is more administrative, military and economic
construction. We interpret overall construction as conveying information on in-
vestment activity in general, administrative construction on investments into state
capacity, military construction as investments into military, and economic construc-
tion as a proxy for economic activity. Aggregate construction patterns are presented
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in Figure 2.5. Construction is increasing from 1400 to around 1750. Aggregate con-
struction reacts to wars, and during the Thirty Years’ War (1618 to 1648) and the
Seven Years’ War (1756 to 1763) overall construction drops.
We estimate the following model
100× Constructionijt =β1Centralizedijt + ζControlsijt + αi + αj + αt + ijt
(2.2)
where Construction is the number of construction events in city i belonging to
territory j in year t. For readability, we multiply construction by 100, and thus
values can be interpreted as construction per century. We differentiate between
overall construction, administrative construction, military construction, construc-
tion of fortifications as a subgroup of military construction, and economic construc-
tion. Centralizedijt is a dummy that takes value 1 if city i is in a territory j that
is centralized in year t. Based on the literature on fiscal capacity, we expect there
to be an increase in administrative and military construction (Hypothesis 3a), as
well as in economic construction (Hypothesis 3b). In this case, β1 will be positive.
Controls are a dummy indicating whether a city has a secondary ruler and a dummy
for whether the territorial affiliation of a city is contested.
We include a number of fixed effects: αi are city fixed effects, αj territory fixed
effects, and αt year fixed effects. We can identify city and territory fixed effects
separately, as several cities switch territories over time. By including these fixed
effects, β1 measures how construction within a city changes after it becomes part of
a centralized territory, excluding all differences in construction of that city compared
to other cities that are constant over time, that are constant over time for all cities
in the same territories, and all time trends in construction over every year that affect
all cities equally. This is important if cities that eventually are part of a centralized
territory have different construction levels even before centralization. It also takes
into account that centralization might occur during a time in which construction
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate Construction over Time
Note This figure shows aggregate construction over time. The gray line presents the raw
numbers, the black line construction patterns based on a moving average of degree 3. Data
sources: see text.
levels change in all cities equally, and controls for aggregate hits on construction
during times of war. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Table 2.2 presents results. Construction at the city level increases after a territory
centralizes (Table 2.2, Panel A). Overall construction increases by 0.411 construction
events per century and this effect is statistically significantly different from zero at
the 5 percent level (column 1). This is around a third of the average construction
of a territory in a century, which is 1.371. Centralization is also associated with
an increase in administrative buildings (0.068, significant at 5 percent level, column
2), which indicates that there are investments into state capacity, as suggested by
hypothesis 3a. In addition, military construction increases by 0.039 (significant at
five percent level, column 3). This is an economically significant increase considering
that on average 0.051 additional military buildings are constructed per century in a
city. However, cities are not more likely to build fortifications, an extremely effective,
but costly military technology that spread during the Military Revolution (column
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Table 2.2: Construction in Cities
Construction
All Admin Military Fortification Economic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Cities
Centralized 0.411** 0.068** 0.039** 0.002 0.037
(0.195) (0.031) (0.017) (0.013) (0.024)
R-squared 0.027 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.007
Panel B: Core vs Peripheral Cities
Centralized, core 0.464*** 0.068** 0.049*** 0.003 0.043*
(0.131) (0.028) (0.014) (0.011) (0.023)
Centralized, periphery 0.038 0.068** 0.011 0.014 0.038
(0.162) (0.033) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024)
R-squared 0.027 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.007
Controls 3 3 3 3 3
City FEs 3 3 3 3 3
Territory FEs 3 3 3 3 3
Year FEs 3 3 3 3 3
Mean dep. var 1.371 0.205 0.051 0.024 0.065
Observations 890,241 890,241 890,241 890,241 890,241
Note Results of Regression 2.2. Controls are a dummy indicating whether a city has a sec-
ondary ruler and a dummy for whether the territorial affiliation of a city is contested. Standard
errors are clustered at territory level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5
per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
4). Positive effects on overall military construction support the claims of the war-
state capacity literature as in Hypothesis 3a. There is no evidence for a differential
increase in investments into novel military technologies after centralization.
Hypothesis 3b states that centralized territories have more economic growth. The
relationship between centralization and economic construction, which we use as a
proxy for economic growth, is presented in column 5. While the estimated coefficient
is similar in size to the coefficients for overall, administrative and military construc-
tion, standard errors are larger for economic construction. There seems to be more
variation with regard to economic growth than for the other variables, and overall
fiscal centralization does not seem to be associated with an increase in economic
construction, and consequently economic growth.
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Do these increases occur equally within centralized territories? In Panel B we differ-
entiate between cities that were in a territory during the time of centralization, and
cities that become part of already centralized territories. We refer to cities that were
part of a territory at the time of centralization as the core, and to cities that became
part of an already centralized territory as periphery. A peripheral city is coded as
centralized after it enters the already centralized territory. We find that only core
cities experience a statistically significant increase in aggregate construction of 0.464
buildings per century (significant at 1 percent level, column 1). Administrative con-
struction increases equally in core and peripheral cities after centralization, which
indicates that investments into administration in general, and fiscal capacity in par-
ticular, are made in all areas of a territory. If a city enters an already centralized
territory, administrative investments will thus increase as if the city had been part
of the centralized territory when it centralized (column 2). However, military con-
struction only increases in core cities of centralized territories (column 3). Military
investments in theoretical models are seen as a public good, i.e. no citizen is ex-
cluded from benefiting from them. The finding that only core cities see investments
into military are inconsistent with this. Since administrative investments are equal
among core and peripheral cities, this difference cannot be due to a lack in the
ability of the territory to enforce fiscal capacity in the peripheral cities. Economic
construction which proxies economic growth, on the other hand, increased by 0.043
(significant at 10 percent level) in core cities, but not in peripheral cities (column 5).
Event study
To get an even better insight into the relationship between centralization and local
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investments over time, we estimate event studies of the following form
100× Constructionijt = β−5Centralizedijt ×Minus5DecadesAndEarlierijt+
+
4∑
t=−4,t6=−1
βtCentralizedijt ×DecadeDummyijt
+ β5Centralizedijt × Plus5DecadesAndLaterijt+
+ Controlsijt + αi + αj + αt + ijt (2.3)
where Constructionijt, Centralizedijt, αi, αj and αt are defined as above.
Centralization is interacted with a set of decade dummies for for the four decades
before and after centralization, where the dummy for the decade prior to cen-
tralization is omitted. In addition, we include interactions with dummies for all
decades that are at least 50 years before (Minus5DecadesAndEarlierijt) or af-
ter (Plus5DecadesAndLaterijt) centralization. Thus, we estimate construction in
cities that will eventually centralize for each decade relative to construction in the
ten years before centralization. We control for whether there is a secondary ruler
and whether sovereignty over the city is contested. We include city fixed effects, αi,
territory fixed effects, αj, and year fixed effects, αt. Thus, βt is the estimate of the
difference in construction in cities that centralize compared to their construction
the decade before they centralize after excluding all differences that are due to city
specific factors, territory specific factors or time specific factors that exist for all
territories.18 Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Results are presented in Figure 2.6, and add more nuance to the results of Table
2.2. There is no pre-trend in overall construction before centralization. Overall
construction only starts to increase in the first decade after centralization, and
continues to increase further over the next decades compared to construction levels in
18In Appendix B.2, we show results of Regression 2.2 when we limit the analysis to all cities that
will centralize eventually. Results are nearly identical, as is expected as we include city fixed effects
in both regressions. Omitting cities that do not centralized will have an impact on the estimates
of the time fixed effects.
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Overall construction Administrative construction
Military construction Fortifications
Economic construction
Figure 2.6: Differences in Construction over Time
Note Results of Regression 2.3 with 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered
at territory level. Data sources: see text
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the decade before centralization. Before centralization, administrative construction,
conditional on city, territory, and year fixed effects, also shows no pre-trends. After
centralization occurs, administrative construction jumps up, and remains on this
higher level. Military construction is slightly lower in the third decade before and
slightly higher in the second decade before centralization compared to the decade
before centralization. After centralization, military construction in centralized cities
increases over the next decades. The construction of fortifications does not differ for
centralized territories before they centralize, but is overall a bit lower in the fourth
decade after centralization. The pattern for economic construction looks less smooth
than that for overall or administrative construction. Economic construction seems
to be lower in all years that are at least 50 years prior to centralization compared
to the period before centralization. After centralization occurs, there is at first no
change in construction patterns compared to non-centralized territories. There is
evidence for a positive effect starting 50 years after centralization. The patterns thus
add further support for Hypothesis 3a, i.e. that fiscally centralized territories invest
more in their administration and their military, as the positive effects begin right
after centralization was introduced. There is no evidence strengthening Hypothesis
3b, which stated that centralized territories experience more growth.
2.6.2 Warfare in Centralized Territories
Military investments are higher in centralized cities that lie in the core of centralized
territories, but does this have an effect on war activities within centralized territories
as is commonly assumed in the literature? We estimate the following regression to
look at the number of attacks cities in centralized territories are subjected to
100× Attacksijt = β1Centralizedjt + β2Centralizedjt × Post1650t
+ αi + αj + αt + ijt (2.4)
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where Attacksijt is the number of attacks in a year in city i in territory j in year t.
We multiply this times 100 for easier readability. Coefficients can thus be interpreted
as the change in the number of attacks occurring in a century. In further regressions,
we differentiate between the number of attacks that lead to physical destruction and
the number of attacks that are associated with monetary losses, for example because
the city was looted, troops were billeted in it, or the city made payments to hostile
troops. This captures the cost of war for the local population. According to the
literature on fiscal capacity people are willing to pay taxes, because by doing so
they are protected from the negative impacts of war. By looking at the relationship
between fiscal centralization and attacks with costs for the local population, we
estimate whether this link existed in the Holy Roman Empire. Centralizedjt is a
dummy that takes the value 1 if territory j is centralized in year i. If βˆ is larger
than 0, cities in centralized territories are subject to more attacks, which we interpret
as indicating that territories are involved in more war in general. Post1650t is a
dummy for all years after 1650, and can be seen as a dummy for the Military
Revolution having taken place. In a second set of regressions we differentiate between
cities that were part of a centralized territory at the timing of centralization and
cities that become part of centralized territories after centralization, i.e. core and
peripheral cities. αi are city, αj territory and αt time fixed effects. Including city and
territory fixed effects is important as attacks predict centralization. By including
fixed effects we only consider changes in the number of attacks, not the overall
level, this means we control for the possibility that centralized territories might
experience more attacks over the entire period under consideration. Standard errors
are clustered at the city level.
Over the entire time period under consideration, the number of attacks on cities
in centralized territories does not change (column 1, Panel A). However, once we
look at the effect before and after the Military Revolution separately, we find that
cities in centralized territories experience 0.003 fewer attacks per year (significant at
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5 percent level) compared to cities that are in non-centralized territories. Next, we
focus on attacks that have negative effects on the affected cities in columns 4 to 6 of
Panel A. The number of attacks that lead to physical destruction is slightly higher
in centralized cities before 1650, but does not differ from the number of attacks
with physical destruction in non-centralized cities after 1650 (column 4). Cities in
centralized territories experience fewer attacks that lead to a loss of money after
the Military Revolution (column 6). After the Military Revolution, when military
investments arguably become important for success in war, increased military in-
vestments of cities in centralized territories are effective in reducing overall attacks,
and as a result they also experience less attacks that lead to losses for the local
population. This confirms the argument made in the literature about the incentives
of citizens to accept the introduction of fiscal institutions.
In Panel B we explore the implication of regional inequalities in military investments
between cities in the core and in the periphery of territories. Column 2 shows that
decreases in the number of attacks only occur in core cities – and only after 1650.
Peripheral cities, where military investments did not increase after they become
part of centralized territories, do not experience a drop in the number of attacks in
general (columns 1 and 2) or the number of costly attacks (columns 3 to 6) either
before or after the Military Revolution.
2.6.3 Vanishing of Territories
Does the ability of centralized territories to finance more military investments trans-
late into a lower probability of vanishing, as stated in Hypothesis 4a? We estimate
the following OLS model to examine the relationship between fiscal centralization,
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and the disappearance of territories
100× V anishjt = β1Centralizedjt + β2Centralizedjt × Post1650t
+ ζControlsjt + αt + it (2.5)
where V anishjt is a variable that takes on the value 1 if territory j vanishes. We
multiply this with 100 for readability. In further regressions we look at different po-
tential reasons for vanishing, such as conflict and extinction of the ruling family.19
After a territory vanishes, it is dropped from the sample. Centralizedjt is a dummy
for centralized territories. Post1650 is a dummy for all years after 1650. We in-
teract centralization with this to estimate whether their connection with territorial
survival changes after the Military Revolution. If βˆ1 is smaller than 0, centraliza-
tion is associated with a lower probability of a territory vanishing before the Military
Revolution. If βˆ1 + βˆ2 is smaller than 0, centralization is associated with a lower
probability of a territory vanishing after the Military Revolution. Controlsjt are
the lagged natural logarithm of the number of cities, a dummy for the existence of
any centralized territories within a 50 km radius, whether there was an attack on
the territory in the current period or the period before. We interact all controls
with a dummy for all years post 1650, and this allows the relationship of the con-
trol variable and vanishing to differ before and after the Military Revolution. αt
are year fixed effects that capture shocks that are common for all territories, which
includes the overall number of centralized territories that exist in each year. We
do not include territory fixed effects because these would predict survival perfectly.
Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Table 2.4 looks at the relationship between V anish and Centralized as outlined in
Regression 2.5. Centralized territories are 0.401 percentage points less likely to cease
to exist in a given year (column 1), which is a very large effect considering that the
19A territory is coded as vanishing due to conflict or extinction if the territory loses at least one
city in the year they vanish due to the respective reason. Results are robust to only regarding
cases where at least 50 percent of all lost cities are lost due to the respective reason.
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baseline probability of vanishing is 0.444 percentage points each year. Controlling
for the existence of centralized neighbors and attacks, the effect decreases slightly
(0.378, column 2). This supports Hypothesis 4a, i.e. centralized territories are less
likely to vanish. In addition we are able to elicit a number of additional interesting
patterns about which territories vanish. The existence of centralized neighbors has
no effect on the general probability of vanishing before or after the Military Revo-
lution. Being attacked increases the probability of vanishing after 1650, indicating
that the novel technologies in warfare introduced during the Military Revolution
increase the ultimate cost of war for sovereigns: warfare can lead to extinction.
Next we turn to different reasons for vanishing. Centralized territories are around
0.05 percentage points less likely to vanish because of conflict, a sizable effect com-
pared to a baseline probability of vanishing because of a conflict of 0.03 percent (see
column 3 and 4). This is in line with the common interpretation in the literature,
where centralization makes territories better at conflict (either by increasing the
probability to win, or by discouraging other territories from engaging in conflict in
the first place, as suggested in Table 2.3), and thus centralized territories are more
likely to survive. In addition, having a centralized neighbor increases the prob-
ability that a territory vanishes because of conflict and this probability increases
even further after the Military Revolution. This might explain why in Table 2.1
we find that territories are no longer more likely to centralize if they have a cen-
tralized neighbor after the Military Revolution: while having a centralized neighbor
increases the incentives to centralize to be able to compete militarily against central-
ized neighbors, it also increases the probability that they vanish because centralized
neighboring territories attack them. Centralization is also associated with a decrease
in the probability of vanishing because of extinction of the ruling family, holding the
number of attacks on cities within the territory constant (0.45 to 0.54 percentage
points lower probability, columns 5 and 6) compared to a baseline probability of
0.18 percent.
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Overall the results in Table 2.4 provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
centralization decreases the probability that a territory ceases to exist because they
are more successful at fighting wars (Hypothesis 4c).
2.6.4 Territorial Expansion
We now want to examine whether centralized territories grow in size after they
centralize, as claimed in hypothesis 4b. To test this, we estimate the following
regression
NumberCitiesjt = β1Centralizedjt + β2Centralizedjt × Y earsCentralizedjt
+ γ1Attacksjt + γ2Attacksjt × Centralizedjt
+ αj + αt + jt, (2.6)
where NumberCitiesjt is the number (or natural logarithm) of cities that belong to
territory j in year t. In different regressions, we use all cities and uncontested cities
(results in Table 2.5 in main text) as well as contested cities and cities with only a
single ruler (results in Table B.3 in the Appendix). Uncontested cities are cities over
which a territory claims sovereignty without this claim being challenged by other
territories, whereas for contested cities this claim is challenged. Cities with a single
ruler are cities in which there is just one territory that claims sovereignty over the
city. Not all cities with several rulers are contested, in some cases several territories
agree on exerting joint control over a city. An increase in the number of uncontested
cities thus measures the increase in the size of territories that is not disputed by
other territories, and offers a measure of an increase in factual control over a region.
Centralizedjt is a dummy indicating whether territory j was centralized in year t,
Y earsCentralizedjt is the number of years territory j has been centralized. We
include this term to allow the effect of centralization on size to grow (or fall) over
the duration of centralization. To see whether the potential relationship between
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centralization and size of territories is driven by attacks, we control for Attacksjt,
the number of attacks in the current period. We interact this with Post1650t to
allow attacks to have a different effect on territory size before and after the Military
Revolution.
αj and αt are territory and time fixed effects. If centralized territories are larger
before they centralize, this will be accounted for by the territory fixed effects. Includ-
ing time fixed effects accounts for any increase in territory size after centralization
that is explained by general time trends and not centralization. This is important if
territories centralize during a time period in which (surviving) territories in general
get larger. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Results are presented in Table 2.5. Territories are larger after they centralize, holding
territory and time fixed effects constant. Centralized territories on average hold 17
additional cities (significant at 10 percent level) after centralization or around 23
percent (significant at 5 percent level) more cities (column 1 in Panel A and B
respectively). This increase in size occurs over time (column 2). A centralized
territory grows by one city every five years (column 2, Panel A) or by 1 percent
every ten years (column 2, Panel B). Controlling for the number of attacks on cities
within the territory in the current decade does not have an effect on these coefficients
(see column 3). Attacks, which we interpret as alluding to war activities in general,
are associated with an increase in territory size by around 1.4 cities (column 3, Panel
A). Centralized territories grow by gaining uncontested sovereignty over cities: in
columns 4 to 6 we only look at the number of cities within territories which belong
to it uncontested by claims of sovereignty by other territories and where this claim
is not contested by other territories. The coefficients are nearly identical to those in
column 1 to 3.
To understand the reasons for the increase in the size of centralized territories, we
calculate the number of cities that enter and leave centralized territories compared
to non-centralized territories using Regression 2.6. Results are summarized in Table
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2.6.
Centralized territories do not gain or lose more cities overall compared to non-
centralized cities, holding constant their current size, and territory and year fixed
effects (columns 1 and 4). There is also no relationship between centralization and
gaining (losing) cities due to conflict (column 2 and 4). Territories that are engaged
in war activities are more likely to gain or lose cities via conflict (columns 2 and 4
in Panel B).
How can we reconcile the finding that centralized territories are larger than non-
centralized territories, but at the same time they do not gain more or lose less cities
than non-centralized territories, ceteris paribus? All territories grow over time, and
centralized territories exist longer, as they are less likely to vanish (see Table 2.4).
Centralized territories thus have the opportunity to grow larger because they grow
over a longer period of time, not because they grow at a higher rate than non-
centralized territories.
2.7 Conclusion
The emergence of fiscal administrations that are able to levy and collect taxes are
an important part of modern state formation (Weber, 1919; Tilly, 1975). In this
Chapter, we document the history of fiscal capacity and how it links to the survival
of territories in the Holy Roman Empire and analyze the causes and effects of the
introduction of the first institutionalized and centralized fiscal organization, the
Chamber.
We show that territories that are exposed to more incentives to centralize – either
because neighboring territories are already centralized or because threat of war is
higher – are more likely to introduce a Chamber. This confirms Tilly (1975) influ-
ential argument that wars led to the formation of states with fiscal administrations.
We also look at the consequences of fiscal centralization, and show that central-
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ized territories are less likely to vanish, and are thus able to become larger than
non-centralized territories. We show that centralized territories invest more in their
administration and in their military. However, military investments do not occur
equally across the territory: increases in investments only occur in those cities that
were already part of the territory at the time it centralized (core territory), not in
cities that enter the territory later (peripheral territory). This has important impli-
cations for the way we should think about fiscal centralization. In theoretical models
citizens agree to have fiscal centralization because they expect taxes to be spent on
a public good, and thus to profit from them. We find evidence for this in the Holy
Roman Empire. However, we add that there is a second important layer: after
centralization was introduced it increases the level of fiscal capacity in the entire
territory. Cities that become part of an already centralized territory do not enter
a bargain with the sovereign on whether fiscal centralization should be introduced,
and are thus not offered any “rewards”, and consequently see no increase in military
investments. Centralization can thus have large effects on inequality within territo-
ries. Higher military investments in the core of territories decreases their exposure
to war when financial resources become important to win wars, whereas there is no
such relationship for peripheral cities.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Explanation of the Coding Process of Territories
Coding the history of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) entails coding the history
of its ruling families. Under loose regency of the Emperor, countless territorial
entities existed, some large (Fürsten- und Herzogtümer), some small (Graf- und
Herrschaften). We aim to assign every entity a unique ID and track its territorial
holdings using said ID. A correct dataset thus depends on identifying ruling units,
and identifying their respective territories.
One can roughly distinguish two types of territories and thus rulers: ecclesiastical
and secular. We understand the largely stable ecclesiastical states under clerical
rule as one entity throughout their existence. Secular territories, however, were
continuously broken up, re-structured, and unified as their rulers changed. These
dynamics were often determined by familial structure: Inheritances defined succes-
sion, warring siblings or heirs split territories, and marriages proved pivotal when no
direct male heir was in a lineage. Understanding and consistently coding this history
thus entails a full understanding of the relevant noble families. For this reason, we
combine territorial information with lineage information.
Regularly, sons inherited their father’s possessions. This could in principle take on
many forms: sons sometimes ruled jointly, split the territory between them, or chose
a unique successor. Most commonly adapted was the Primogenitur ; here, the oldest
son inherited all possessions from his father. The Golden Bull of 1356 instituted
the Primogenitur in all electorate territories of the Holy Roman Empire, and other
minor territories followed suit. Succession became more intricate when a ruler died
without eligible (i.e. male) heirs. While surrounding rulers might have tried to
bolster an inheritance claim through strategic marriage, or negotiating a contract
to this effect, there were often multiple claims, causing dispute and sometimes war.
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We trace lineages (that is, a string of male rulers in one family) throughout their
existence by assigning a unique individual code. If a lineage dies out, its Territory
ID vanishes with it. In the occasion of a split inheritance between siblings, we attest
that there is always one favourable part of the territory. The sibling who inherits
the favourable territory inherits the lineage dummy. For the newly founded lineage,
a new code is established. Free cities and ecclesiastical territories are assigned one
code throughout their history.
To record the territorial holdings, cities are then assigned to their respective rulers
as expressed through the lineage codes. For every change, we record its specific
reason. If a city is outside the Holy Roman Empire in a given period, we record
the state it belongs to, and the family ruling the state, adhering to the rules stated
above.
The rule structure of many cities was in reality multi-layered: one family could own
estates but enfeoff others, for example. To account for this, we trace secondary
in addition to primary rulers, conscious that we will not be able to depict actual
power relations accurately. We include secondary rulers as robustness checks and
for extended analyses.
Finally, we adjust the territorial dataset to fit the specific application regarding
fiscal centralization of states. In order to accurately depict treatment, we “stitch
together” states where a ruling family dies out but its institutions survive, and revert
to the territorial definitions most suitable to the specific question.
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B.2 Figures
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Figure B.1: Number of Territories and Concentration of Cities
Note Left axis shows number of territories, right axis the Herfindahl Index that measures the
concentration of cities across territories. Data sources: see text
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Overall construction Administrative construction
Military construction Fortifications
Economic construction
Figure B.2: Time Patterns of Construction, Intensive Margin
Note Results of regression 2.3 limiting the sample to cities that will at some point be part of a
centralized territory with 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at territory
level. Data sources: see text
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B.3 Tables
Table B.1: Centralized Territories and Dates of Centralization
Territory Year Name Selected Sources
Albertine Saxony 1524 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 816)
Prince-Bishopric of
Augsburg
1718 Hofkammer Wüst (1987, p.39)
Margraviate of
Baden-Baden
1588 Rentkammer Taddey (2000, p. 168)
Carlebach (1906, p. 43)
Margraviate of
Baden-Durlach
1578 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p.
630), Taddey (2000, p. 168)
Prince-Bishopric of
Bamberg
1638 Hofkammer Weiß (2010)
Duchy of Bavaria 1550 Hofkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 581)
Margraviate
Brandenburg
1577 Amtskammer Schultze (2004, p. 142-3)
Electorate Cologne 1587 Hofkammer Wüst (1987, p. 37)
Bishopric of Eichstätt 1651 Hofkammer (Braun, 1991, p. 94)
Landgraviate of
Hesse-Darmstadt
1595 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 648)
Landgraviate of
Hesse-Kassel
1558 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 648)
Duchy of Jülich-Berg 1547 Rechenkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 708)
Duchy of Cleve Mark 1557 Rechenkammer Schottmüller (1896, p. 66)
Electoral Palatinate 1557 Rechenkammer Press (1970, p. 99-100)
Electorate of Mainz 1532 Hofkammer Wüst (1987, p.37)
Duchy of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin
1659 Kammer Hamann (1965, p. 83)
Duchy of
Mecklenburg-Strelitz
1701 Kammer Hamann (1965, p. 99)
Prince-Bishopric of
Münster
1573 Rechenkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 732)
Prince-Bishopric of
Paderborn
1723 Hofkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 735)
Ernestine Saxony 1633 Kammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 853)
Electorate of Trier 1719 Hofkammer http://www.
rheinische-geschichte.
lvr.de/orte/Gebiete_
1789/herrschaften/
Seiten/Kurtrier.aspx
Duchy of Württemberg 1521 Rentkammer Bernhardt (1971, p. 32-3)
Bishopric of Würzburg 1553 Kammer Reuschling (1984, p. 232-4)
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Table B.2: Attacks on Territories and Gains and Losses of Cities
Gains Losses
Number ln Number ln
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline
Attack 90.906*** 0.119*** 38.984 0.075***
(32.187) (0.028) (26.791) (0.028)
Observations 18,233 18,233 18,233 18,233
R-squared 0.235 0.309 0.183 0.205
Panel B: Controlling for attacks in past
Attack 91.058** 0.100*** 37.866 0.066**
(37.520) (0.028) (24.333) (0.026)
Attack, one year before -24.572 0.003 49.860** 0.043*
(42.988) (0.027) (22.691) (0.025)
Attack, two years before 5.118 0.009 4.065 -0.024
(29.314) (0.021) (31.949) (0.028)
Attack, three years before 16.337 0.002 -22.200 -0.010
(27.518) (0.022) (37.512) (0.025)
Attack, four years before -7.569 -0.016 -4.398 -0.001
(15.285) (0.019) (23.370) (0.024)
Attack, five years before 11.401 0.014 58.783* 0.014
(22.264) (0.024) (32.883) (0.027)
Observations 12,842 12,842 12,842 12,842
R-squared 0.225 0.315 0.170 0.211
Note Column 1 and 3 look at the absolute number of gains/losses, column 2 and
4 at the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of gains/losses. Standard errors
are clustered at the terrtitory level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10
percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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3 | Exorcizing Hitler: Anti-Semitism and
the Denazification of Germany
Our ability to adapt is amazing. Our ability to change isn’t quite as spectacular.
Lutz (2010)
3.1 Introduction
Attitudes and beliefs can persist over surprisingly long periods. For example, Guiso
et al. (2016) show that self-governance promoted cooperation among city dwellers in
medieval Italy, and that the same locations are richer today, have a more developed
civic society, and have access to more financial services. Areas of Africa exposed to
the slave trade in the 17th and 18th century are still poorer today, and they exhibit
lower levels of interpersonal trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). The German
occupation of Russia and the annihilation of Jewish life continues to shape local
political and economic conditions (Acemoglu et al., 2011). Similarly, Voigtländer
and Voth (2012) find that German towns and cities that had anti-Semitic progroms
at the time of the Black Death in 1348-50 were still much more anti-Semitic in the
interwar period. Persistence of beliefs may reflect strong patterns of parent-child
transmission of attitudes (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011;
This Chapter is joint work with Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth.
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Zumbuehl et al., 2013).
At the same time, there is abundant evidence of changes in attitudes and beliefs –
from behaviors like duelling to attitudes towards pre-marital sex, women’s rights,
and gay marriage, culture can change surprisingly rapidly (Fernández-Villaverde
et al., 2011). During the Protestant Reformation culture changed in large parts of
Europe (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Becker et al., 2016; Cantoni, 2015). Alesina
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that Germans who grew up in East Germany
believe more in redistribution and government intervention than their peers in the
West.
What is less clear, however, is when, how, and why beliefs change over time. Recent
experimental evidence suggests that the right kind of institutional framework can
quickly influence attitudes such as trust (Cassar et al., 2014). There is evidence that
schooling plays a role; teaching styles, compulsory schooling, and school curricula
have been shown to shape political and civic attitudes of students (Algan et al.,
2013; Bandiera et al., 2018; Cantoni et al., 2017). At the same time, policies aimed
at integrating immigrants in 16 different European societies appear to have only
limited effects (Aleksynska and Algan, 2010). Restrictions on beliefs can also lead
to a backlash; in Fouka (2016) language restrictions strengthen the value individuals
assign to their ethnic identity, and lead to an increase in investments into it. Under
what conditions can persistence of beliefs and attitudes be overcome?
In this chapter, we examine the effectiveness one of the largest social experiments
in history: denazification, i.e. the systematic attempt by the victorious Allies to
re-educate the entire German population after 1945 aiming to stamp out racial
hatred, authoritarianism, and militarism (Biddiscombe, 2007). Allied policy during
the war established denazification as a priority for the time after victory. The
occupying forces took over the administration of Germany, ran and licensed all
newspapers and other media, revamped school curricula, and incarcerated hundreds
of thousands of citizens who had been involved with the Nazi regime. Millions of
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Germans had to submit detailed questionnaires and hundreds of thousands were
tried in Allied courts; many were dismissed or imprisoned. Anti-Semitism changed
from an officially sanctioned principle of policy to a public taboo; citizens were
forced to visit former concentration camps and attend films depicting the horrors of
the Holocaust.
There are many reasons to believe that the denazification program was not suc-
cessful: there was personnel continuity at many levels in German society, and for
example around 94 percent of Bavarian judges and prosecutors, and 77 percent of
employees in the finance ministry were former members of the Nazi Party in 1951
(Judt, 2005). 60 percent of West Germany’s reconstituted diplomatic corps had
served either in the SS or the Gestapo. Nor did attitudes in the overall popula-
tion change quickly: more than a third of Germans in the 1950s felt that Germany
should not have Jews living within its borders, and a quarter still held Adolf Hitler
in high regard. Even today, opinion polls regularly find that a significant share of
the German population holds anti-Semitic views (Bergmann and Erb, 1997).
Our indicator of denazification success in this paper are profanations of Jewish ceme-
teries – an expression of extreme levels of anti-Semitism. To control for historical
anti-Semitism, we link profanations after World War II to the occurrence of pro-
fanations during the Weimar period, i.e. before the Nazi regime. There is local
persistence of anti-Semitism, but only in the American occupation zone; municipali-
ties in which Jewish cemeteries were profaned during the Weimar Republic are more
likely to experience profanations after 1945 in the American sector, controlling for
the number of Jewish cemeteries. There is no persistence in the British sector.
We then study when attitudes persist or change in this unique historical setting.
Denazification policies differed significantly by Allied zone of occupation after 1945.
The US pursued a highly ambitious and highly punitive program that saw mass
arrests and mass dismissals, based on multiple-choice questionnaires. In particular,
cases of minor perpetrators were often dealt with quickly and with greater harshness
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than those of major war criminals, who often received light sentences after a long
investigation. In contrast, British authorities largely focused on a small group of
major perpetrators. Survey and anecdotal evidence at the time already suggested
that the US approach largely failed.
To investigate the mechanisms behind the large-scale failure of the denazification
project, we collect new archival data on Allied policies to test three potential chan-
nels. First, we examine how lenient the local tribunals that decided on punishments
for individuals for their Nazi past were. Lenience in this case means to what extent
rulings were less strict than what the Allies thought was appropriate punishment
for perpetrators of different degrees. For each county in the US zone, we gather
information on the quality of denazification tribunals from a survey by the spe-
cial branch in the US military responsible for denazification. We conduct a similar
exercise for the British zone of occupation, using individual-level data on denazifi-
cation questionnaires and subsequent tribunal decisions. Where there is evidence of
lenient denazification practices, anti-Semitism disappears. Second, we look at the
cooperation between the local, German-led administration and the Allied Forces.
We collect information on the existence of street names that should have been re-
named during denazification, but were not, in the vicinity of each municipality to
capture this. There is no effect of this on the levels or persistence of anti-Semitism.
Third, we explore the role of stressing “collective guilt” during denazification. We
compare persistence of anti-Semitic attitudes in locations that were and that were
not exposed to forced visits of concentration camps, a policy that stressed the re-
sponsibility of every German for the atrocities of the Third Reich. This does not
have an effect on anti-Semitic behavior or its persistence. Overall, our findings lend
support to the view that punitive justice is not an effective way to modify beliefs or
to win “hearts and minds”.
Research on modern-day anti-Semitism in Germany has already shed some light on
the role of the past, and on factors influencing transmission. Individuals that were
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exposed to Nazi ideology at school between 1933 and 1945 are still more anti-Semitic
in 1996 and 2006 (Voigtländer and Voth, 2015). Anti-Semitism is also transmitted
across generations; based on self-reported survey returns, for example, Jacob et al.
(1999) find that right-wing Germans have twice as many grand-parents who were
members of the Nazi Party or the SS.
This chapter also relates to a growing literature on the historical causes and effects
of the Holocaust, and of the effects of World War II. Acemoglu et al. (2011) show
that parts of Russia occupied by the Germans — where the majority of domestic
Jews died -– experienced slower city-growth, and still have a greater proclivity to
vote for the Communist Party. Grosfeld et al. (2011) argue that the extermination
of Jews in the pale of settlement in Eastern Europe has contributed to a persistent
anti-market culture. Peer effects during the Nazi period have been investigated
by Waldinger (2010, 2011), who finds that the purge of German universities after
1933 lowered the quality of research amongst PhD students. Akbulut-Yuksel and
Yuksel (2015) argue that expelling Jewish school teachers had major effects on the
educational accomplishments of German students after the Nazi takeover.
On the theory side, our research is related to work modelling the transmission and
change of cultural norms. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) assume that parents choose
preferences for their children that will both make them more similar to themselves
but also equip them to prosper among the cultural norms prevalent in broader so-
ciety. In Greif and Tadelis (2010) individuals can publicly support cultural norms,
while they secretly hold on to preferences that are banned under the current polit-
ical regime. If restrictions on norms are lifted, these secretly held believes quickly
resurface. Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) analyze how historically evolved norms of
co-operation can change through the influence of prominent agents. In Giuliano and
Nunn (2017) cultural persistence arises in settings with less cross-generational in-
stability in the surrounding environment, and cultural change arises if there is more
cross-generational instability in the surrounding environment.
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Relative to the existing literature, our contribution is threefold: first, in contrast
to studies using self-reported evidence on anti-Semitism, we study revealed anti-
Semitism by using profanations of Jewish cemeteries. This allows us to avoid the
potential for bias in self-reporting. Second, we document regional persistence of an
attitude that is heavily discouraged. Official policies banning anti-Semitic behavior
and extensive efforts to re-educate Germans have not been able to fully eradicate the
transmission of racial hatred. Third, we show under which conditions cultural norms
cannot be changed by governments, and when they are malleable. Anti-Semitism is
lower in areas that witnessed relatively “fair” and pragmatic denazification efforts,
and persistence exists when the population perceives denazification as “unfair”.
The Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of the history of
anti-Semitism on German territory since World War I and discusses Allied denazi-
fication policies after World War II . Section 3.3 presents our data and section 3.4
the main empirical results. Section 3.5 focuses on channels. Robustness checks are
summarized in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Historical Background and Context
Anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic behavior in Germany exist at least since the Mid-
dle Ages (Cohn, 2007). In this section, we briefly summarize the history of anti-
Semitism in Germany during the interwar years, denazification efforts in the British
and American zone1, and anti-Semitism after World War II.
3.2.1 Weimar Period
During World War I, anti-Semitism in Germany experienced new heights. In the
course of the war, Jews were blamed for food shortages and involvement in the black
market. The army ordered a census of all Jewish personnel, allegedly to counter
1These are the two zones the empirical analysis will be based on.
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claims that few German Jews served in front-line positions. It never published the
results. With the war lost, many right-wing politicians started to blame Jews (in
addition to pacifists and socialists). The leading role of Jewish politicians in the
revolution of 1918 fanned the flames of anti-Semitic sentiment even further.
Anti-Semitic sentiments during the Weimar Republic were expressed in a variety of
forms. There were hate-speeches, pogroms, as well as several murders of prominent
Jewish politicians. The number of profanations of Jewish cemeteries increased (Dia-
mant, 1982, p. III). Many political parties campaigned with an anti-Semitic agenda
(Striesow 1981). One of the most radical parties was the German National Socialist
Worker’s Party (NSDAP), even though it toned down the more radical anti-Semitic
parts of its agenda after 1928 (Stachura 1978, Heilbronner 2004). During the fi-
nal years of the Weimar Republic, Nazi paramilitary units directed violence against
Jewish shopkeepers, synagogues, and cemeteries (Walter 1999).
The extent of racial hatred at the core of National Socialism only became fully
visible after 1933. Starting with boycotts of Jewish establishments and the exclusion
of Jewish civil servants and doctors, persecutions grew more comprehensive and
vicious. As the German sphere of influence expanded after 1939, these policies
eventually culminated in systematic genocide in the extermination camps of Central
Eastern Europe.
3.2.2 Denazification
After World War II, Germany was divided into four occupation zones (American,
British, French, and Soviet). In each zone, the occupation powers engaged in de-
nazification. Denazification was a set of different practices aimed at re-educating
Germans, and at removing National Socialist ideology. Implementation in each zone
differed, but attitudes towards Jews took center stage in the Western occupation
zones. When the denazification program came to an end, millions of cases had been
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processed and some two million Germans were punished (Biddiscombe, 2007).
In the American zone, the denazification program was comprehensive and highly
punitive – in total, a quarter of the population living under American occupation was
affected (Teschke 2001). Many Germans were forced to visit concentration camps,
or to attend public viewings of films showing the horrors of the Holocaust (Judt,
2005). In 1946, local tribunals under German administration (Spruchkammern) were
established. While initially denazification started resolutely, practical concerns and
social pressure slowed the process thereafter (Herz, 1948). Since the most important
cases were left for last, perpetrators of smaller crimes were often punished quickly
and severely, while many important Nazis escaped punishment altogether or were
only mildly punished.
Initial German enthusiasm for the process quickly gave way to scepticism amid com-
plaints about unfairness. A popular joke at that time went “What is the difference
between a Spruchkammer and a fish-net? A fish-net catches the big ones, and lets
the little ones get away!” (Taylor, 2011, p. 292). In the American zone, German
support for denazification dropped from 57 percent in 1946 to 17 percent by 1949. In
some areas, there was no co-operation of the German administration with the pro-
cess whatsoever. In the rural Bavarian community of Wolfratshausen, where 8,000
of the 40,000 inhabitants had been Nazi party members, the conservative Landrat
(district head) and his associate stamped every single questionnaire with the words
“nothing prejudicial known” (Biddiscombe, 2007, “nichts Nachteiliges bekannt”).
The program was also regarded as a failure by the American military government.
The Jewish Adviser to the American Military Governor, Rabbi Philip Bernstein,
summed this up when he said in 1947: “If the United States Army were to with-
draw tomorrow, there would be pogroms on the following day” (quoted in Ferguson,
2015, p. 196).
The British Control Commission for Germany (CCG) considered the American
approach of mass arrests and massive re-education as impractical and counter-
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productive (Teschke 2001). The British focused on removing powerful Nazi party
members, minimizing dismissals in a bid to balance practicality and justice. By
1946, the British turned the process over to German denazification panels. These
processed 2 million questionnaires (in a population of 22 million). Judgments be-
came milder the more control was ceded to lower-level German local tribunals. While
some historians have been sceptical of the British approach, it bred less resentment
than the American one – in 1946, the German public generally urged greater rigor
and comprehensiveness (Turner, 1989). This shows the pragmatic and limited na-
ture of British efforts at denazification, as well as the significant public support the
program enjoyed.
3.2.3 Anti-Semitism after Denazification
The overall effects of denazification have been difficult to assess. The American mili-
tary government immediately began conducting surveys, and estimated in 1946 that
almost 40% of Germans were anti-Semites; of these, close to half were labelled “hard-
core”. A study in 1948 found similar values (Bergmann and Erb, 1997). German
surveys in the early 1950s also put the proportion of anti-Semites at approximately
a third of the population. Later studies found similar proportions all the way into
the 1970s (Silbermann, 1982). The 1980s saw an increasing tendency to discuss the
need for Schlußstrich — drawing a line under discussion of the past and Germany’s
historical guilt for the Holocaust. By 1989, in West-Germany, one survey classified
only 46% of the population as not anti-Semitic, and put the proportion of those
with extreme or significant negative views of Jews at 14% (Emnid, 1989).
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of East Germany, public attention
focused on anti-democratic and violent tendencies in the former East.2 Neo-Nazi
2The Soviet zone of occupation covered East Germany. The Soviet authorities were primarily
concerned with establishing Communist administrative control. Denazification was secondary.
Nazi members were dismissed from administrative positions, but party members without major
crimes on their record were encouraged to join the Communists. In general, the Soviet approach
is considered “relatively tough denazification” (Biddiscombe, 2007). The process had some degree
115
Exorcizing Hitler
violence against foreigners is a particular concern. Overall, radical right-wing parties
have had only limited success in post-war Germany. In the late 1960s, the NPD
(Nationaldemokratische Partei – National Democratic Party) won seats in regional
elections; it never reached the required 5 percent of the vote in federal elections
(Bromba and Edelstein, 2001). Since 2004, it is represented in the Saxon diet,
and receives a measure of support in most areas of East Germany. In 2011, new
information revealed that a string of murders in Germany since 2000 had been
perpetrated by a terror group called Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National
Socialist Underground). Several of those implicated in these crimes were close to
the NPD.
3.3 Data
We use profanations of Jewish cemeteries as a measure for the local existence of
severe anti-Semitism. While offenders are not always known, most profanations in
the time frame of our study were carried out by anti-Semitic groups (Diamant, 1982,
p. III). We collect information on Jewish cemeteries and their profanations from
a handbook on Jewish cemeteries (Diamant, 1982), which lists all known Jewish
cemeteries in West Germany, based on Jewish handbooks from 1918 to 1933 and
newer regional sources. The book also includes all known profanations until 1981.
We collected data on the effectiveness of denazification activities at the local level.
From the records of the Office of the Military Government in the US Zone (OM-
GUS), we obtained detailed reports on the state of denazification activities. These
were compiled by the Special Branch of the US Army, which supervised the process.
Each location received a county-level score on a scale from 1 (poor) to 6 (superior).
Based on the scores given in 1946, we generate a dummy for districts that were
of legitimacy because high-ranking, tainted officials, especially judges, were removed thoroughly;
communists tended to cooperate with denazification. At the same time, the harsh behavior of
Soviet troops towards civilians in 1945 undermined the population’s support for policies of the
occupying power, and it was considered by many as a form of victor’s justice.
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Figure 3.1: Cemeteries and Occupation Zones in Germany
Note This map of Germany in its current borders depicts the four allied occupation zones after
World War II and the location of Jewish cemeteries. Data on cemeteries in the Soviet zone are
likely to be incomplete. The data on Jewish cemeteries is from Diamant (1982).
117
Exorcizing Hitler
rated as having poor, fair or satisfactory denazification activities. Worse scores are
associated with more lenient rulings. For example, in a report from 1947 on the
district of Büdingen, which received a poor score it is stated that party members
that should have been categorized as offenders were classified as mere followers, i.e.
classified in the denazification category IV:
“To my question of why so many small office holders are found in category IV they
answered that the Tribunals don’t consider the formal incrimination of a respondent
as a real incriminantion. If the PP’s (public prosecutors, authors’ note) can’t enu-
merate specific charges such as manhandling, denunciation etc. the formal charges
fall by the wayside.”3
Another example comes from the district Ziegenhain, which also received a poor
score. The Denazification Branch of the Civil Administration Division notes
“Generally the case decisions favour the defendant. Charges brought by witnesses
and exonerating circumstances are given major priority”4
For the British zone, no elaborate system of repeated assessments on the US model
existed. Tribunals staffed by British authorities assessed a much smaller number of
cases, predominantly involving public sector employees; it made decisions quickly
and in a relatively uniform fashion. To assess local variations in the nature of
decision-making, we use 748 denazification files of employees of the Labor and Social
Insurance Office. For each employee, we know their function and their involvement
with various NS organizations including their duration and the person’s rank, as well
as the final decision rendered by the British authorities. To construct a measure
3For the original document, see Figure B.2 in Appendix B (Source: Hessisches Staatsarchiv
Darmstadt, Q 4 Nr. 8/78-2/6, p. 16).
4For the original document, see Figure B.3 in Appendix B (Source: Hessisches Staatsarchiv
Darmstadt, Q 4 Nr. 8/78-3/14, p. 106).
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of local variation, we compare actual decisions with predicted ones (based on the
observed organization membership(s) and function). Counties where the local tri-
bunal systematically imposed more lenient penalties than would be expected given
the observables are classified as “lenient denazification”.
To measure the cooperation of local elites with the denazification policies of the
occupation forces, we consider street names in 2017.5 During the Nazi period, many
streets were (re)named in line with Nazi ideology, for example after war heroes,
important figures of the NSDAP, or Hitler himself. During the denazification pro-
gram, these streets had to be renamed by local German authorities (Azaryahu, 1990,
2012). We regard the existence of street names that should have been renamed, but
were not, as a proxy for absence of cooperation by the German local administration.
In particular, we examine streets that were named after Braunau (Hitler’s birth-
place), Erwin Rommel (a German general), and Hindenburg (former President of
the Weimar Republic who appointed Hitler as Chancellor).6 Data on street names
are based on maps in OpenStreetMap.7
To test whether differences in persistence between zones are driven by a different
emphasis on collective guilt during denazification, we look at one particular policy
that is likely to stress this: forced visits of concentration camps. When concentration
camps on German soil were liberated, outraged Allied commanders often forced the
German population to visit the camps. What began as spontaneous actions by low-
level army commanders – mainly in the US zone of occupation – became a systematic
element of re-education programs. Visits were intended to shock and create feelings
of guilt. They were seen as “dramatic sites for some of the earliest accusations of
German collective guilt for the war, Nazism and what we now call the Holocaust"
5For the use of street names in quantitative analysis refer to Oto-Peralías (2017).
6Street names that contained Hindenburg were to be renamed according to the occupation
powers. This is for example stressed by the Ministry of Interior of Northrhine Westphalia, see
Figure B.1 in Appendix B (Source: Stadtarchiv Münster, Amt 47, Nr. 3).
7The streets were collected by Geofabrik and made available by the German newspaper
Die Zeit at https://www.zeit.de/feature/strassenverzeichnis-strassennamen-herkunft-deutschland-
infografik (last visited February 14th, 2019). The dataset includes all streets that were included
in the online maps on October 10th, 2017.
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(Mauriello, 2017, p. 27). Many Germans resented the practice. As contemporaries
recall, they could be made to attend, but not to watch or engage (Judt 2005).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive dataset on forced camp
visits. However, we do know that camp visits were forced on local populations;
given logistical conditions after 1945, lifting people who lived at distances greater
than 30 km was not feasible. Instead of using actual visits, we simply use potential
visits to known sites of concentration camps, indicated by a camp being located
within 30 km.
Election results and socio-economic statistics are from Falter and Hänisch (1990),
who digitized statistics from the interwar period. This data is available for all
municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants, or as the average value for all
municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants in a county.
3.4 Persistence
To analyze persistence of profanations of Jewish cemeteries in the American and
British occupation zone, we estimate the following linear probability model
Profanationi = β1American+ β2ProfanationWeimarRepublici
+ β3ProfanationWeimarRepublici × Americani
+ γControlsi + i (3.1)
where Profanationi is a dummy for profanations of Jewish cemeteries between 1946
and 1981 in municipality i that has a Jewish cemetery. In additional regressions,
we use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of profanations as the depen-
dent variable. ProfanationWeimarRepublici is a dummy for the occurrence of at
least one profanation of a Jewish cemetery during the Weimar Republic. We limit
our analysis to places in which Jewish cemeteries exist. American is a dummy for
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all municipalities that belonged to the American zone of occupation after WW II
(for the extent of the American zone refer to Figure 3.1). β2 and β2 + β3 measure
the persistence of extreme anti-Semitism in the British and American sector respec-
tively. Controls are the natural logarithm of the number of cemeteries, the share
of protestants as well as the share of Jews in 1925, and the natural logarithm of
population in 1920 in municipality i.8 i are robust standard errors.
Table 3.1: Persistence of Anti-Semitism
Profanations after WW II
Dummy ln Number Dummy ln Number
(1) (2) (3) (4)
American -0.012 -0.008 0.030 0.030
(0.035) (0.031) (0.128) (0.114)
Profanation Weimar Republic -0.119* -0.087
(0.066) (0.059)
Profanation Weimar Republic 0.276** 0.213**
× American (0.123) (0.107)
Profanation Nazi period -0.008 -0.013
(0.076) (0.062)
Profanation Nazi period -0.024 -0.024
× American (0.131) (0.116)
Controls 3 3 3 3
Observations 874 874 874 874
R-squared 0.089 0.150 0.083 0.146
Note This table presents results of regression 3.1. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3
is a dummy for the existence of any profanations after World War II. The dependent variable
in columns 2 and 4 is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of profanations. Controls
are the natural logarithm of the number of cemeteries, share protestants 1925, share jews 1925
and natural logarithm of population in 1920. Data sources see text. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Results are presented in Table 3.1. Profanations are persistent in the American
occupation zone; municipalities with profanations during the Weimar Republic are
more likely to experience profanations after 1945. Interpreting the model as a linear
probability model, the probability of having a profanation after 1945 is around 15
percentage points higher for municipalities in the former US zone in which Jewish
8If socio-economic data from the time of the Weimar Republic are not available at the munici-
pality level, we assign the average value of all municipalities in the corresponding county for which
no municipality level data is available.
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cemeteries were profaned during the Weimar Republic compared to municipalities
in the US zone without profanations (column 1). The number of profanations is
around 13 percent higher in American municipalities with a profanation during the
Weimar Republic than in all other municipalities (column 2). There is no persistence
of profanations in the British zone of occupation. In columns 3 and 4 we link
profanations after World War II to profanations during the Nazi period from 1933
to 1945. During the Nazi period, anti-Semitic behavior was seen favorably, and
in 93 percent of municipalities the Jewish cemetery was profaned. Thus, we would
expect profanations during this time to be driven less by extreme forms of local anti-
Semitism compared to profanations during the Weimar Republic, when profanations
were officially sanctioned. In line with this, we find that there is no link between
profanations during the Nazi era and the post war era (columns 3 and 4). This is
in line with the interpretation that profanations during the Weimar period capture
local differences in anti-Semitism.
3.5 Channels
What explains the persistence of extreme anti-Semitism in the American and the
lack of persistence in the British sector? We examine the role of three potential
differences in the denazification process in the American and British sector that
might drive this. First, individuals were punished more severely in the American
sector in the course of individual level denazifiction in denazification tribunals. Ger-
mans felt that the American denazification was stricter when dealing with “average”
Germans than when dealing with former Nazi elites, and thus considered the pro-
cess as inherently unfair. This might have influenced the ability of Americans to
influence anti-Semitic preferences, and could have led to the observed failure of re-
education efforts. Second, it could be the case that there were differences in how
well the American and the British occupation government worked together with
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local German authorities, which carried out many of the denazification policies. If
cooperation was worse in the American sector, and denazification was thus imple-
mented to a lesser extent at the local level in the American sector, this could explain
the persistence of anti-Semitic attitudes in the American sector. Third, the Amer-
ican occupation government put more emphasis on the concept of collective guilt
in their denazification strategy, i.e. it was much more vehement in stressing that
all Germans collectively were responsible for the horrible crimes committed in the
Third Reich. Germans resented this, and if they were thus unwilling to take part in
the denazification efforts this could explain the observed pattern.
3.5.1 Lenience of the Denazification Tribunals
First, we turn to within zone variation of the working of the civilian courts. We
estimate model 3.1, additionally controlling for a dummy capturing lenience of de-
nazification within a district in the American and British sector, which indicates
whether German perpetrators were punished less severely than official guideline by
the Allies recommended. Lenient denazification in the American zone is defined
as scoring poor, lenient or satisfactory on a rating of the quality of denazification
conducted by the US military in 1946. In the British zone, lenient denazification is
having less strict verdicts in denazification tribunals than would be expected given
individual’s memberships in Nazi organizations. Results are presented in Table 3.2,
where columns 1 and 5 present the results of the baseline model for comparison.
Lenient tribunals are associated with a 16 percentage points lower probability of
having any profanations after 1945 (column 2) or 12 percent fewer profanations af-
ter 1945 (column 5). This effect is the same for municipalities with and without
profanations in the past. In addition, once we control for lenience, there is no longer
any persistence of profanations in the American (or British) sector. Differences
between the American and British sector thus seem to be the result of the harsh
rulings of local tribunals in the American sector. This finding is in line with the
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qualitative assessment of denazification policies in the US sector, and the reasons
for their limited success.
3.5.2 Cooperation of Local Authorities
Denazification effectiveness was also subject to the cooperation of local authorities
with the Allied forces; differences in the extent to which American and British
officials were able to work with local German authorities could drive the observed
differences in persistence. We proxy the willingness of local authorities to foster
denazification by the existence of street names in 2017 that reflect Nazi ideology,
and that should have been renamed according to denazification directives, i.e. a
dummy for the existence of any Hindenburg, Braunau or Rommel streets within 10
km of municipalities.9 We control for the number of streets within 10 km of the
center of municipality i. Standard errors account for heteroskedasticity.
Lack of cooperation from local authorities does not explain persistence of profa-
nations in the American sector; the coefficient of profanations during the Weimar
Republic interacted with a dummy for the American sector remains unchanged (Ta-
ble 3.2, columns 3 and column 7). Controlling for the existence of street names that
were not changed does not influence the pattern of persistence in the US sector.
The coefficients of the baseline models remain unaffected. There is thus no evidence
suggesting that denazification in the US zone was less successful than in the British
zone, because of a lack in cooperation by the local administration in the former
zone.
3.5.3 Collective Guilt
The third potential channel we test is the role of collective guilt by examining within
zone variation of forced concentration camp visits. Forced concentration camp vis-
9Shapefiles for municipalities borders after 1945 are not available, thus we refer to this measure.
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its were seen as a way to establish the feeling of collective guilt among Germans.
The American denazification policy put more emphasis on establishing this feeling
of collective guilt than the British policy. If this explains the difference between
the American and British zone, we would expect that places that were exposed to
forced camp visits in both zones to demonstrate higher levels of persistence of anti-
Semitism. No comprehensive dataset on forced camp visits exists, thus we measure
the intention to treat effect by looking at the existence of a concentration camp with
forced visits within a 30 km radius. We interact this with American to allow the
effect of forced camp visits to vary between the two occupation zones.
Forced visits to concentration camps do not affect the existence or number of pro-
fanations in the American or British occupation zone (see Table 3.2, columns 4 and
8). They also do not affect the persistence of historic profanations in the American
sector; the coefficient of profanations in the American sector and its standard errors
do not change when we control for forced visits. This suggests that the different
emphasis on collective guilt in the American and British sector does not drive the
differences in persistence of anti-Semitism between the two sectors.
3.6 Robustness
In our analysis, we have used a linear probability model to look at the existence
of any profanation as an outcome. However, a disadvantage of such models is that
they do not take into account that an event can either occur or not, and thus predict
probabilites below zero or above one. To account for this, we repeat the analysis
using Probit and Logit models which take the nature of the binary outcome variable
into account. Table 3.3 shows that results on persistence and channels also hold
when estimating a probit model (columns 1 to 4) or a logit model (columns 5 to 8).
The magnitude of the effects is also similar. For the baseline effect, the predicted
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increase in the probability of a profanation for the average municipality10 in which
a Jewish cemetery was profaned during the Weimar period and that lies in the
American sector is around 26 percentage points in the probit (column 1) and 25
percentage points in the logit specification (column 5), compared to 28 percentage
points in the linear probability model. Coefficients for the regressions exploring the
channels of the persistence are also nearly identical in size and magnitude in the
probit and logit model compared to the linear probability model. Again, we find
that once we account for the lenience of the rulings of the local tribunals, there is no
longer persistence of anti-Semitism at the municipality level in the American sector.
3.7 Conclusion
Hostility towards outsiders has been common in human societies for millennia (Choi
and Bowles, 2007; Alexander and Christia, 2011; Bernhard et al., 2006). Theories
that seek to explain this hostility often emphasize the importance of interactions
with the minority group. For example, many interpretations of lingering racism
in the United States have emphasized repeated interactions between whites and
African-Americans (Blalock, 1967). Alternatively, scholars have emphasized indi-
rect benefits for groups such as enhanced co-operation and trust within networks of
insiders (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Henrich et al., 2001). Eco-
nomic explanations also focus on personal gains for “hate entrepreneurs” (Glaeser,
2005). These explanations of out-group discrimination are predicated on the object
of animosity being present.
We focus on an environment where the object of animosity – Jews – was notably
absent after 1945. Our study demonstrates the persistence of racial prejudices at
the local level in the American zone, and across one of the greatest discontinuities in
recorded history. The Allied forces implemented massive programs of denazification
10By average municipality we mean, a municipality for which all other variables take on the
mean values that are found for the entire sample.
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that varied across regions. In the US zone, which pursued a highly ambitious, highly
bureaucratic, and highly punitive approach, there is evidence of persistence of anti-
Semitism. The US approach to denazification is widely considered as a failure (Herz,
1948). It was overly ambitious, and inconsistently implemented – especially the
rapid and harsh punishment of low-level officials, while higher-ranking perpetrators
escaped lightly – undermined the program’s credibility and perceived fairness. The
US zone registers markedly higher rates of Jew-hatred today, even after controlling
for pre-existing historical differences. In contrast, the British denazification was
relatively limited in scope, and is generally described as pragmatic (Biddiscombe,
2007). It focused on high-ranking officials involved in major crimes, and made
removing them a priority. This policy enjoyed wider support among the public.
In the British zone of occupation there is no evidence for persistence of historical
anti-Semitism.
To examine the mechanisms behind the striking differences in persistence further,
we compile measures of within-zone variation in policies. We find that more lenience
in tribunal decisions during the occupation is systematically associated with lower
levels of anti-Semitism today and explains the persistence of anti-Semitism in the
American zone. Second, we find no evidence that cooperation of local authorities or
additional punitive policies, such as forced camp visits, had an effect on attitudes.
Our findings relate to an important strand in the literature on cultural economics –
the making of “oppositional identity”. In models where agents derive utility from
holding particular beliefs, threatening them can lead to a backlash — an overinvest-
ment in the trait that is under attack. While the theoretical literature describes
how such a pattern could arise (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Bisin and Verdier, 2000)
our study is one of the first to provide empirical evidence for an adverse reaction.
To the best of our knowledge, Fouka (2016) is the only other paper that makes a
related argument in the context of language policies in the US after 1918.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Figures
Der Regierungspräsident
K 31 - 0
A b s c h r i f t
Münster, den 26.Juni 1947
An die
Stadt- und Landkreisverwaltungen
Betr.: Namensänderung von Straßen und Plätzen.
Auf meine Anfrage, ob der verstorbene Generalfeldmarschall
und spätere Reichspräsident von Hindenburg unter die Direktive Nr.
30 des Kontrollrates fällt, hat mit der Herr Innenminister des Lan-
des Nordrhein-Westfalen mit Erlaß vom 16.ds.Mts. - I-IOO - 4
Abschrift eines an einen Ratsherrn in Bielefeld erteilten Bescheides
übersandt, der folgendermaßen lautet:
" Auf Ihre Anfrage, ob mein Erlaß vom 8.2.47 über die Namensänderung
von Straßen und Plätzen auch für den Namen Hindenburg anzuwenden
ist, teile ich Ihnen ergebenst mit, daß für die Entscheidung Nr.V
der nweisung 30 des Alliierten Kontrollrats vom 13.5.46 maßgebend
ist; darin heißt es:
" Die Ausdrücke "militärisch" und "Militarismus" und der Ausdruck
"Kriegerische Ereignisse" sind so auszulegen, daß sie sich auf
alle kriegerischen Ereignisse nach dem 1.8.1914 zu Lande, zu
Wasser oder in der Luft beziehen und auf alle Personen, Organi-
sationen und Einrichtungen, die direkt damit verbuiiden sind."
Hindenburg ist zweifellos mit den Ereignissen des ersten Welrkrie-
ges eng verbunden und nur weil er damals als großer Feldherr galt
und nicht, weil er ein-eifahrener und kluger Politiker war, wurde
er nach dem Tode des ersten Reichspräsidenten Friedrich Ebert zu
dessen Nachfolger gewählt. Seine militärische Herkunft 1st dann
auch später von der Reaktion und militaristischen Kreisen immer
wieder hervorgehoben worden, als man seine politischen Fehlgriffe
zu entschuldigen versuchte. Die Förderung der Nationalsozialisten
durch die Berufung Hitlera zum Reichskanzler, die Bestätigung des
Ermächtigungsgesetzes von 1933, das unter offenbarer Verletzung
der von ihm selbst mit "seinem Manneswort" beschworenen Reichsver-
fassung zustandegekommen ist, das Schweigen zu den Morden der BA
am 30.Juni 1934 und die Billigung der Aufrüstung bewiesen, daß Hin-
denburg nicht die Fähigkeiten eines sogenannten großen Staatsmannes
gehabt hat, daß sein Name vielmehr eng verknüpft ist mit den An-
fängen des jetzigen Chaos. Die Beibehaltung der Straßen-,Platz-
und Schulbezeichnungen mit dem Namen Hindenburg ist daher mit den
wiedergegebenen Bestimmungen des Kontrollratsgesetzes nicht zu
vereinbaren. "
Zusatz für den Landkreis ~üdinghausen: Zum Bericht vom 18.4.ds.Jrs.
- 54 - 15 I/3 -.
In Vertretung:
gez. Dr. Prange
Beglaubigt:
gez. Unterschrift
Angestellte.
Figure B.1: Directive on Renaming of Hindenburg Streets
Note: Directive by the Ministry of Interior of Northrhine Westphalia on the renaming of streets
named after Hindenburg (Source: Stadtarchiv Münster, Amt 47, Nr. 3).
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Figure B.2: Report on Local Tribunal in Büdingen
Note: Report by the US military government for Hesse on the local tribunal in Büdingen (Source:
Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, Q 4 Nr. 8/78-2/6, p. 16).
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Figure B.3: Report on Local Tribunal in Ziegenhain
Note: Report by the US military government for Hesse on the local tribunal in Ziegenhain (Source:
Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, Q 4 Nr. 8/78-3/14, p. 106).
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